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INTRODUCrION

State unfair competition law, here understood to encompass misrepresentation and misappropriation, is a means by which our eco-

nomic system is regulated, and presumably enhanced, through the
grant of property rights in commercial intangibles. Misrepresentation
occurs when one competitor attempts to pass off its goods or services by
deceptively imitating some identifying feature of another's goods or
services. Misappropriation generally involves the inverse situation: it
occurs when one party associates the product of another with itself. The
award by New York courts of exclusive rights in intangibles, be they
designations of product source or, more generally, information sufficiently unique to warrant an exception to the general rule that information is in the public domain, is made to further several objectives. Primary among these are incentives to creation and marketing
of the intangible and related products, and maintenance of standards
of business ethics.
This Comment examines New York State unfair competition law.
It is divided into three sections: (1) a general discussion of the parallel
structures of federal and state law, situating state unfair competition law
within a framework of federalism; (2) a detailed survey of misrepresentation law; and, (3) a consideration of property rights granted under the
doctrine of misappropriation.
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I. PERSPECTIVES ON STATE PROTECTION OF
COMMERCIAL INTANGIBLES

A. The Theoretical Basis of Property Rights in Intangibles
Intangibles, by which we mean things such as ideas, symbols, systems and information,1 are exceptional in the extent of the disparity
between the costs of creation and the costs of reproduction. In the absence of property rights in intangibles, their creators would have no
mechanism other than secrecy to appropriate to themselves the economic value their creations might have. One consequence would be
that people would choose to invest in creating intangibles only if they
were willing to risk resources in pursuit of things whose personal value
alone would justify the expenditure. Of course, civilized beings without formal legal incentives would likely create some intangibles for
public use, but the level of production would presumably be lower
under such circumstances than it is with a system of property rights. An
absence of property in intangibles might be expected to produce two
other consequences. Because the society needs certain kinds of ideas
and information to function efficiently, a reduced level of investment
in the production of intangibles would lead to inefficiencies within the
society. And because the creators of intangibles that other people
found useful and lucrative were not rewarded beyond their own use
of the intangible, they might feel that they had been treated unfairly.
The grant of a property in intangibles has, then, two aspects: economic and moral. The economic aspect involves the incentive to
creation and optimal use of resources for the maximizing of the owner's
benefit that results from the grant of a property right, and hence a
monopoly, in a thing. The high prices and restricted dissemination that
are the consequences of monopoly2 provide the orginator of the thing
with a reward and thus an incentive to create more things. The burden
of a monopoly is borne to provide an incentive for people to risk resources to satisfy other people's needs. The property right simply provides the originator with a means to appropriate the value that other
people place upon the innovation.
Harold Demsetz, an economist, has theorized that innovation in
the law of property occurs when old arrangements are poorly attuned
1. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HALv.'L. REv. 888 (1964).
Intangibles have been defined to include "ideas, information, formulas, designs and
artistic creations, fame, goodwill and performances of talent." Id. at 932.
2. R. LIsEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMiCS 344 (2d ed. 1969).
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to changing technology and market values. 3 Such a theory is consistent
with the development of trademark law in the United States. The Industrial Revolution, which increased the level of manufacturing activity and the size iind geographical impact of individual enterprises,
had made the goodwill that accrues to a business more valuable. The
costs of creating a property right in vessels of goodwill-enforcement
costs, strictures on competitors' vocabularies of source designation,
higher barriers to market entry-were deemed outweighed by the
benefits accruing from the creation of such property rights-incentive to
the creation and exploitation of goodwill and assurance to consumers
of a particular level of quality. By the 1850's, New York courts had
recognized an action for trademark infringement. 4
It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe the law's activity in the
property field solely to a pursuit of the abstract economic ideal of optimal allocation of resources. In developing property rights, courts have
exhibited their communities' moral preferences for private ownership.5 Concern has been shown to avoid unjust enrichment and to ensure an appropriate reward for desirable activity. The 1849 case of
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear & Ripley6 explicated this moral basis of
trademark protection:
He who affixes to his own goods an imitation of an original trade
mark, by which those of another are distinguished and known seeks,
by deceiving the public, to divert and appropriate to his own use, the
profits to which the superior skill and enterprise of the other had
given him a prior and exclusive title. He endeavors, by a false representation, to effect a dishonest purpose; he commits a fraud upon the
public, and upon the true owner of the trade mark. The purchaser has
imposed upon him an article that he never meant to buy, and the
owner is robbed of the fruits of the reputation that he had successfully labored to earn."
More than one hundred years later, the court of appeals put the mater succinctly when it stated that "if the defendants' methods are de3. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights (pt. 2), 57 A31. EcorN. REv. 347
(Papers and Proceedings 1967).
4. Howard v. Henriques, 5 N.Y. Super. Ct. (3 Sandf.) 725 (1851); Amoskeag
Mfg. Co. v. Spear & Ripley, 4 N.Y. Super. Ct. (2Sandf.) 599 (1849). The history of
trademarks is extensively documented in F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE LAw RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925); Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks,
45 TRADEMARK REP. 127 (1955); Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of Trademarks,
33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 876 (1951).
5. See generally Demsetz, supra note 3, at 350.

6. 4 N.Y. Super. Ct. (2 Sandf.) 599 (1849).
7. Id. at 605-06.
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ceitful and run contrary to accepted business ethics, the public policy
of the State is relevant, though perhaps not decisive, in evaluating a.
claim of unfair competition." 8
B. Plasticityof PropertyRights in Intangibles
The dual character of unfair competition's grant of a property
right, at once economic (providing an incentive to optimal use of resources) and moral (reinforcing dominant customs), injects greater
than usual complexity into the formulation and application of legal
rules. In addition to the difficulties associated with economic and ethical analysis and the problems of weighing the results of one against
the other, the subject matter of unfair competition-intangible trade
values-poses its own set of challenges to legal process. Unlike palpable
objects which lend themselves to exclusive dominion and consequently
simple decisions of protectability, intangibles-ideas, indicia of product source, business systems-are by their nature evanescent and difficult to categorize: they are not so readily susceptible to determinations
of protectability and infringement.
This state of affairs should not require an exhortation to a mechanical jurisprudence of commercial intangibles. It may, however, justify
an admonition to the unwary of the flexibility and particularism which
inhere in this branch of the law as a consequence of the limits of legal
formality.9 The relativity of the property concept is a desirable consequence of constant flux in market values, technology and mores.
C. Commercial Intangiblesin New York-Federal and State Doctrines
Although this Comment concerns itself with New York State misrepresentation and misappropriation doctrine, an understanding of the
policies effected by these laws requires a survey of the boundaries of
state and federal protection of related intangibles. By outlining the
range of legal theories available for the protection of intangibles, a bet,
ter sense of the current and future content of trade symbol and misap
propriation protection can be provided. The preliminary sketches
which follow are intended also to illustrate the economic and ethical
functions of property rights in intangibles.
1. Trade-Symbols. The trade-symbol functions both as an incentive to the creation and exploitation of commercial goodwill and as an
8. Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 568, 161 N.E.2d 197, 204,
190 N.Y.S.2d 977, 987 (1959).
9. See generally Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIE S 351 (1973).
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assurance to consumers of quality and fair dealing. The monopoly
granted in certain symbols designating product source must perform
these functions without violating the basic economic principle that
optimal allocation of resources in a market economy requires that
competitors of similar size function in a market with sufficiently low
barriers to entry for new competitors. 10 In short, a legal monopoly
as to source designationmust not be allowed to foster monopoly of the
market with its baneful tendency to lower output and inflate prices.
Consequently, the law favors the use of arbitrary and fanciful terms 1
which impose minimal restraints upon other producers' vocabularies
of source designation. The use as a mark of language which describes
the product is therefore generally proscribed, 12 because competitiors
will have difficulty describing their goods and consumers will be less
able to compare similar products. Likewise, a producer whose arbitrary
mark comes to be a generic term for that type of product will lose the
monopoly in that designation.' 3 If a trade-symbol is sufficiently entwined with the function of a product, the law of unfair competition
will not protect it.' 4 Otherwise, such symbols would erect barriers to
market entry which might inhibit effective competition. Also, interests
in old-fashioned commercial honesty are fostered by prohibitions
against deceptive trademarks, 5 the passing off of one's goods as those of
another, 16 and the assumption of another's trade name, even absent
product competition between the parties.' 7
Since 1946, the Lanham Act 8 has provided for federal registration of marks used in interstate commerce, and has codified federal
rights and remedies attendant upon mark ownership. The exercise of
federal authority in this area has not preempted parallel state rights
with respect to source designation. 9 There are several important contrasts to be made between federal and state trade-symbol protection.
Federal trade-symbol authority is limited by the jurisdictional predicate
10. F.
11.

MACHLUP,

THE EcoNoiIcs

OF SELLERS' COMPETITION

533 (1952).
§ 721, com-

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1970); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

ment a at 579-80 (1939).
12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1970); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 721,
comment a at 579-80 (1939).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1970).
14. See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1970).
16. E.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
17. Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods. Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup.
Ct. 1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
19. State law offers the sole protection of marks which do not affect interstate
commerce. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
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of use of the mark in interstate commerce. 20 In addition, the mark must
be registered before the advantages of the Lanham Act accrue to the
trade-symbol holder.21 New York State rights, by way of comparison,
are independent of mark registration. 22 Finally, state doctrine offers
trade-symbol holders some rights and remedies unavailable under the
23
Lanham Act.

2. Technologicaland CommercialInformation.Patent law, the federal implement for encouragement of technological innovation, provides a seventeen-year monopoly in the manufacture, use and sale
of new, non-obvious, and useful processes, machines, manufactures,
compositions of matter, or improvements thereof.24 The extensiveness
of the patent monopoly, with its correspondingly greater potential for
higher prices and restricted output, has been responsible for the rigorous judicial enforcement of the standards set by Congress. 25
Trade secrets, defined by the Restatement of Torts as "any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it,"26 are protected against
disclosure 27 through, breach of a confidential relationship or through
the use of improper means such as wiretapping. Unlike patent protection, for which disclosure is a necessary precondition, trade secret protection requires secrecy as a sine qua non. The theoretically perpetual
monopoly thus afforded is limited by the availability to competitors of
independent discovery and reverse engineering. Rights in trade secrets
encourage investment in innovation and maintain standards of commercial morality.
Two distinct relationships between trade secret and patent law
have been noted: a threshold and a bypass relation. 28 The threshold
relation encompasses the innovator's use of trade secret law during the
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1970).

21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117 (1970).
22. See text accompanying note 111 infra.
23. E.g., summary proceedings, notes 196-209 infra & accompanying text; dilution
protection, notes 181-195 infra & accompanying text; product repackaging protection,
notes 246-254 infra & accompanying text.
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103 (1970).
25. From 1948 to 1957, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found only 4.8% of
the patents that came before them valid and infringed. Cooch, The Standard of Invention in the Courts, in THE DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEMa 57 (W. Ball ed.
1960).
26. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5-8 (1939).
27. Id., comment f at 10.
28. Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. Rv.
873, 894-95 (1971).
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period prior to patent application while the invention is being perfected. The bypass relation refers to the use of trade secret law as an
alternative to patent protection, either because of inability to meet
standards of patentability or because of the potentially unlimited duration of trade secret protection.
3. Copyright and Related State Doctrines.Under the federal statute
of 1909,29 the copyright owner, upon compliance with formalities of
notice at the time of publication, is given exclusive rights lasting up to
56 years in the original expression (other than ideas) of an author.
These rights include exclusive rights to "print, reprint, publish, copy
and vend the copyrighted work." 30 The term "writings," found in both
the constitutional grant of power 3 ' and in the statute, has been construed broadly to encompass a wide variety of two and three dimensional objects. 32 Professor Nimmer has suggested that the requirement
of a writing is satisfied where the "form of... an object (as distinguished
from its functional utility) constitutes an expression of intellectual
creation ....

,,33

, Prior to publication, an author's original work, sufficiently elaborated to be more than a mere idea, is protected by common law copyright, 34 sometimes known as the right of first publication. Common law
copyright provides the author with rights as extensive as those provided
by statutory copyright. 35 In addition to protecting the commercial expectations of an author during the pre-publication period, common law
copyright's potentially perpetual protection promotes interests in human
dignity and autonomy associated with privacy law.3 6
Statutory privacy law37 protects individuals against unlicensed
commercial exploitation of their name and likeness. The rights are
personal and therefore not assignable.38 A limited waiver of privacy
29. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, reads: "[The Congress shall have Power] to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ......
32. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1974).
33. M. NIMMER, ON COPYIGHT § 8.6 (1973).

34. Id. at § 11.2.
35. Id. at§ 111.

36. See Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968).
37. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948). Section 50 provides:
"A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising, . . . the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such
person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
38. Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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may preclude any rights under the statute. 39 An important limitation
on the operation of privacy statutes is their subordination to first
40
amendment rights of free press.
The general rule in New York for property in ideas is that they
are "free as the air." 41 However, if the idea contains elements of novelty
and originality, express and implied-in-fact contracts may be enforced.4
It remains uncertain whether courts will imply in law contracts to
pay for ideas under the standards set forth in the leading case of
43
Downey v. GeneralFoods Corp.

Misappropriation, the "free ride" doctrine, 44 is unfair competi-

tion's tort of last resort. Since its innovation in International News
Service v. The Associated Press,4 5 New York courts have invoked the

doctrine in a broad variety of contexts to create property rights in intangible trade values where other, more precisely articulated, theories
would not suffice.4 6 The doctrine is an equitable one which epitomizes

the incentive and unjust enrichment function of unfair competition's
award of a property right. Its still unresolved potential for conflict with
47
federal copyright law will be examined in this Comment.
D. FederalPreemptionand State Unfair Competition
Patent and copyright law are the federal instruments of incentive to
technological and artistic innovation. Reward for production of sub-

ject matter meeting the statutory standards takes the form of a monopoly in the subject matter for 17 years in the case of a patent, and
39. See Wrangell v. C.F. Hathaway Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 649, 253 N.Y.S.2d 41
(lst Dep't 1964).
40. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rand v. Hearst Corp., 31 App.
Div. 2d 406, 298 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1st Dep't 1969), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 806, 257 N.E.2d
895, 309 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1971).
41. Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 287, 171 N.E. 56, 58 (1930).
42. See Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 335
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).

43. Id.

44. Alexander v. Irving Trust Co., 132 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 228
F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996 (1956).
45. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
46. The residual role of misappropriation within the law of unfair competition is
illustrated by the preclusive effect either federal or state rulemaking may have upon
misappropriation protection of a given subject matter. For instance, F.C.C. regulations
setting fee arrangements for cable transmission of broadcast signals, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51.65 (1974), would seem to have foreclosed the use of misappropriation where a taking
of such signals is at issue. Similarly, Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56,
286 N.E.2d 257, 335 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1974), by requiring novelty and originality as prerequisites for property in ideas, has precluded misappropriation protection for ideas
lacking these attributes, absent unethical conduct by defendants.
47. See text accompanying notes 326-331 infra.
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as much as 56 years for a copyright. The duration and rights attendant
upon these monopolies are the product of a congressional balance
between the short term detriment to the competitive system of a monopoly and the long term benefit following from the creation of the
48
subject matter.
State unfair competition law, and particularly trade secret law,
common law copyright and misappropriation, strikes a similar balance
in granting monopolies in subject matter not protected by federal law.
When a state created monopoly in a particular subject matter will
clash with the objectives of a federal statute, the supremacy clause40
requires the invalidation of the state monopoly.50 However, because the
federal copyright and patent statutes contain no explicit provisions
regarding state incapacities in this area, the availability of state protection has been a function of judicial evaluations of the potential for
conflict between federal and state law.5 1 The last ten years have seen a
shift in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the area occupied by
Congress in passing the copyright and patent statutes. From the position
that the federal statutes are the exclusive devices for creating monopoly
exceptions to the general rule of free access, the Court has come to
recognize a coordinate state role in striking that balance between monopoly and access that is crucial to a competitive system.
After the Supreme Court's 1964 rulings in the companion cases
of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.5 2 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 53 state competence to create property rights in intangibles seemed severely limited. Although the recent decisions of the
Court in Goldstein v. California4 and Kewanee Oil Co. v. .Bicron
Corp.5 5 have substantially undermined Sears and Compco, a sketch of
the holdings in the earlier cases is necessary to an understanding of
developments in the area over the past ten years.
In Sears and Compco, the Court reviewed the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' finding of unfair competition under Illinois law
stemming from defendant's imitation of an invalidly patented product,
and the consequent likelihood of confusion as to the source of the
product. Despite doubts as to the correctness of the seventh circuit's
48. Goldstein, supra note 28, at 878-79.
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.

50. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
51. Compare, e.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971)
with Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1047 (6th Cir. 1973).
52. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
53. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
54. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
55. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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interpretation of Illinois law,5 6 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
chose to rest his opinion upon the combined effect of the writings
clause of the Constitution, 57 federal copyright 8 and patent5 9 statutes,
and the supremacy clause. 60 By interpreting the Constitutional and
statutory provisions as embodiments of a policy of national uniformity
as to the standards by which innovation can be encouraged through a
monopoly grant, Justice Black concluded that "when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others
to copy that article."' 1 He did exempt the tort of misrepresentation
from his preemptive thrust by saying that the states have "power to
impose liability on those who, knowing that the public is relying upon
an original manufacturer's reputation for quality and integrity, deceive
the public by palming off their copies as the original. '"62
The indiscriminate swath of tfe Sears Court's version of federal
preemption occasioned considerable consternation among courts and
commentators.6 Taken literally, state incapacity to prohibit copying
of unpatented or uncopyrighted material would seem to require invalidation of common law copyright,6 trade secret law, misappropriation, contracts involving limited copying, rights of publicity and forgery laws. Because the Court failed to deal explicitly with the diverse
policies embodied in these doctrines, and neglected to develop the
legislative history of the patent and copyright statutes in any detail,
its conception of their respective roles in the economy was, ultimately,
unpersuasive. State and lower federal courts in New York have displayed considerable ingenuity (and disingenuousness) in avoiding
Sears by reference to a murky distinction between "copying," state
prohibition of which is precluded, and "appropriation," a valid subject
for state regulation.6 5
In 1969, the continued vitality of the strong federal policy favoring
free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection was
56. 376 U.S. at 227 n.2.
57. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; see note 31 supra.
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970).
59. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
61. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
62. Id. at 238.
63. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.,
42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 '(Sup. Ct. 1964) (duplication of broadcaster's voice
is appropriation, not copying); Symposium-Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?,
64 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 1178 (1964).
64. But see 376 U.S. at 231 n.7 (1964); 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
65. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42
Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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established in Lear,Inc. v. Adkins. 60 There the Court overruled licensee
estoppel, the doctrine which had precluded licensees from asserting the
invalidity of the licensor's patent in an action to enforce the royalty
agreement.
Significantly, the Court chose not to decide whether state enforcement of a contract regulating access to an unpatented secret idea was
preempted by federal patent law. Justice Black's dissent took issue with
the majority's refusal to so decide, claiming that such a result was required by Sears.67 His dissent pointed up the erosion of support for
his absolutist version of federal preemption, a version seemingly
adopted by the Court only five years earlier.
The erosion begun in Lear has continued apace in Goldstein V.
California6 and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 9 Despite the Court's
refusal in these cases to expressly overrule Sears, it has effectively removed the presumption of invalidity which formerly attached to state
prohibitions of copying. Goldstein involved the application of a state
criminal statute which prohibited commercial copying of records.1 0 The
defendant contended that state power to proscribe copying of sound
recordings was preempted both constitutionally 71 and by the copyright
statute. 72 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, framed the constitutional issue in the Hamiltonian terms of whether state copyright
authority "would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant" 73 to a similar authority in the federal government. Vindication
of concurrent state authority proceeded by recourse to the text of the
Constitution's patent and copyright clause, 74 an analysis of the implications of potential interstate conflict and a consideration of whether
conflicts would necessarily arise between state laws and congressional
policies.
Although agreeing with Justice Black that the objective of the
patent and copyright clause is the creation of uniform national rights,
66. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
67. Id. at 676.
68. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
69. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
70. Defendant's alleged acts of copying took place before February 15, 1972 and
thus were outside the scope of Public Law 92-140, by which Congress had established
copyright protection for sound recordings fixed after that date and which provided that
its provisions were not to apply retroactively. 412 U.S. at 551-52.
71. Petitioners relied on the copyright clause, U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl.8; see
note 31 supra.

72. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970).
73. 412 U.S. at 553, quoting, A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (B.
Wright ed. 1961).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 8; see note 31 supra.
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the Court relied upon the 18th-century patents granted by states to
promote local contributions to science, and the absence of any affirmative indication that all writings are of uniform national concern, to
assert that an inference from the text of the clause of exclusive federal
control over writings is unjustified. 75 As to the inevitable conflicts which
would arise as a result of variations among state copyright laws, the
Court saw the primary effects of such variation as no different from
those attending all state sanctioned monopolies-they are worth less
than federal monopolies. In the absence of any attempt to impose
tariffs and without an overriding need for uniformity, federal preemption was unjustified. The potential of state copyrights for conflict with federal policies was disposed of as a matter of constitutional
preemption by allusion to congressional supremacy in these matters
Because Congress has available to it the means either to protect a
writing, determine that it should not be protected, or leave the issue
of protection to the states, the supremacy clause assures the subordina-.
70
tion of state to federal interests in the area.
The Court's task in analyzing the statutory preemption issue was
to determine which route Congress had taken with respect to sound
recordings. Had Congress, in omitting protection for such recordings
from the 1909 Copyright Act, decided that they must not be protected
or did they leave that issue to the states? A look at the Copyright Act's
legislative history convinced the Court that Congress, taking its cue
from the 1908 case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co.,7 ' had viewed records as component parts of a machine, capable of
reproducing a protectible writing but not themselves renderings of an
original artistic performance. Hence, exclusion of records from the Act
was a consequence of congressional inattention rather than a command
8
that they be free from all restraints.7
In supporting this proposition and in distinguishing Sears, the
Court emphasized .the distinction between areas of congressional indifference and the areas in which Congress had drawn a "careful balance" between the "need to encourage innovation and originality of
invention" and the "need to ensure competition in the sale of identical
or substantially identical products." The Court amplified this distinction in dicta:
The standards established for granting federal patent protection to
75. 412 U.S. at 557.

76. Id. at 559-70.
77. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
78. 412 U.S. at 570.
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machines thus indicated not only which articles in this particular
category Congress wishes to protect, but which configurations it
wished to remain free. The application of state law in these cases
[Sears and Compco] to prevent the copying of articles which did not
meet the requirements for federal protection disturbed the careful
balance which Congress had drawn and thereby necessarily
gave way
9
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
The attempt to confine state protection to subject matter not
within the scope of the federal statute foundered during the next term,
when the Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.s0 considered the
validity of trade secret protection of a patentable process. Petitioners in
that case had invested more than a million dollars in developing a
process which enabled them to produce 17-inch crystals useful for the
detection of radiation. The crystals produced by this process had been
marketed for more than a year and the process was therefore no longer
patentable for want of novelty under section 102(b) of the Patent
Act.8 ' Respondent Bicron Corp. was formed by former employees who
had signed agreements not to disclose trade secrets learned in the course
of their employment at Kewanee. Soon after its formation, Bicron
Corp. was able to grow identical 17-inch crystals. Petitioner sought
injunctive relief and damages for misappropriation of trade secrets and
prevailed in United States district court as to 20 of the 40 claimed trade
secrets. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that
state trade secret protection was preempted by the federal patent
law. 2 The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the district court's
judgment.
The Court in Kewanee disposed of the constitutional preemption
issue by referring to Goldstein and its reliance on the "great diversity
of interests in our nation" in resolving the analogous problem of preemption of state regulation of writings. By equating writings with discoveries for purposes of constitutional preemption, the Court was able
to address the "more difficult question" of whether state trade secret
law conflicted with the operation of the federal patent statute and was
therefore void under the supremacy clause. This required analysis of
the operation of trade secret law in relation to the three federal patent
policies which the Court articulated: encouragement of invention, retention in the public domain of public domain materials, and disclosure of invention.
79. Id. at 569-70.
80. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).

81. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
82.

478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
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As to the first, trade secret protection's function as an incentive
to invention was seen as harmonious with patent law's identical function. Consistency with the second policy was deemed satisfied by the
Ohio trade secret law's requirement of minimal novelty as a prerequisite for trade secret status. The confidentiality thus required
precluded any true trade secret from public domain status. The third
federal policy, that of public disclosure of invention, necessarily presented the greatest potential conflict with a form of protection that
relies on secrecy as a sine qua non. The Court's vindication of trade
secret law here drew upon Judge Friendly's analysis in Painton & Co. v.
Bourns, Inc., 83 to distinguish among three kinds of trade secrets: those

clearly unpatentable, those possibly patentable, and those clearly patentable. Trade secret protection for the first category did not interfere
with the policy of public disclosure since the owner of unprotectable
subject matter could disclose it to the public through patent application. Moreover, trade secret law fostered the creation and dissemination
of knowledge by allowing the owner to recoup the fruits of his labor
through licensing or use. With respect to subject matter of dubious
patentability, the Court perceived that the possibility of an eventual
declaration of patent invalidity may deter disclosure without respect to.
trade secret laws. As to the last category, the clearly patentable invention, the less extensive monopoly afforded by trade secret was seen to
minimize its deterrent effect on patent application. Moreover, partial
preemption only as to clearly patentable subject matter would interfere with state administration of trade secret laws.
The central interpretive problem raised by the Kewanee opinion
is the current status of the Sears doctrine. There can be little doubt
that the teaching of Sears has been much attenuated. A comparison of
Justice Black's Sears dicta to the effect that federal copyright and patent
were the only permissible instruments of monopoly subsidy, with the
Goldstein Court's finding of the validity of state copyright in subject
matter not considered by Congress and the Kewanee Court's finding of
the validity of state trade secret protection in subject matter considered
by Congress and not meeting federal standards of patentability, should
make that clear.
The Kewanee opinion cited Sears four times, three times in support of innocuous propositions asserting federal supremacy in these
matters,8 4 and once for the ambiguous tenet "that which is in the public
83. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).

84. 416 U.S. at 479, 480, 482.
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domain cannot be removed therefrom by action of the states."8 Given
this lack of specific attention, one might proceed by applying the
Kewanee methodology to the Sears facts to determine how state prohibitions of product simulation based solely on a likelihood of consumer confusion clash with the objectives of the patent law as defined
by Kewanee. The initial problem is that product simulation's conflict
with federal law focuses not only on patent law, but also on design
patent and copyright laws. Assuming, arguendo, that the three patent
law policies articulated in Kewanee-incentive to invention, disclosure
of invention, and retention in the public domain of public domain
materials-are equally definitive of the policy bases of copyright and
design patent,8 6 resolution of the matter is still somewhat arbitrary.
Since any form of monopoly subsidy provides incentive to invention
and since product simulation protection encourages disclosure, the
invalidity of such protection would have to follow from the public
domain status of product designs. To resolve the issue of the extent of
federal preemption the Court must explicitly endow the term "public
domain" with sufficient meaning. To date, it has not.
One commentator has suggested that the policy for which the
Kewanee Court cited Sears, Compco and Lear, the retention within
the public domain of public domain material, is little more than a
non sequitur and that Sears and Compco have been sub silentio overruled.87 However that may be, there did exist prior to Sears subject
matter whose protection by the state would be contrary to congressional
intent.s8 Examples of this include formerly patented and copyrighted
material whose monopolies have expired. Such material is plainly
within a public domain, its retention in which is a significant federal
policy. Although the Burger Court has not yet addressed itself explicitly
to the parameters of this public domain, a tentative, partial resolution
of the meaning of "public domain" could proceed by reference to two
criteria employed by the Goldstein and Kewanee Court: Congressional
85. Id. at 481.
86. An argument that this is not the case can be found in Katz, The Doctrine of
Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 So. CALIF. L. RyV. 375,
386-87 (1951). Professor Katz contends that because copyright protects expression
rather than ideas and because copyrighted material has less impact on a state's economy
than patented material, the threat to the competitive ideal is considerably diminished
where copyright is involved.
87. Goldstein, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.: Some Notes on a Closing Circle,
1974 Sup. CT. REV. 81.
88. See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952) (typography);
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), (uncopyrighted fabric

design).
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attention to the subject matter and voluntary communication to the
public. The former provided the Goldstein Court's rationale for exclusion of sound recordings from the public domain. The latter, embodied
both in the state common law copyright requirement that subject
matter not be published, and in trade secret law's prerequisite of minimal novelty, was intimated somewhat tangentially by the Goldstein
and Kewanee Court's citation of Justice Brandeis's statement of the
"general rule of law . . . that the noblest of human productionsknowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions and ideas-become, after
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use."89
This interpretation suggests that subject matter considered, yet not
protected, by Congress cannot be protected by the states after its volurtary communication to the public. One difficulty with this analysis is
that it voids contractual agreements which might protect such subject
matter, a questionable result. A more serious objection is that if the
Court had wanted to lay down such a standard, it would have done so
explicitly.9 0
II. MISREPRESENTATION DOCrRNE

A. State Trade-Symbol9' and Misrepresentation Law--Some Preliminaries
Two bodies of law, one federal and one state, govern trade-symbols.
The relationship between the two has been heavily influenced by the
89. 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) (emphasis added),
citing 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918). By holding that the concept of publication was inapposite to subject matter not considered by Congress, the Goldstein Court suggested
a relationship between voluntary dissemination, congressional consideration of subject
matter and state authority which supports this Comment's analysis.
90. Despite this residue of uncertainty with respect to the scope of federal preemption, judicial resolution of the issue in its present posture could be obviated by
congressional passage of the Copyright Revision Bill, S.22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301
(1975), H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1975).
Two decades of legislative work may soon culminate in passage of the bill which
would preempt common law copyright. In so doing it would abolish "publication" as the
dividing line between federal and state authority. The implications of that bill for
state doctrines such as misappropriation are explored in Goldstein, Federal System
Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 49, 53-55 (1969); Comment,
Copyright Revision: Preemption as a Panacea, 27 O1Ho ST. L.J. 176 (1966); Comment Preemption of State Unfair Competition Protection Under the Proposed Copyright Revision, 41 U. CoLo. L. REV. 115 (1969); Comment, The Misappropriation
Doctrine After Sears-Compco, 2 U. SAN FRaNcISco L. Rnv. 292, 313-17 (1968).
91. The term "trade-symbol" as used here refers to any "symbol" which falls
within the definition of "trade-mark," "service-mark," or "trade-name" as defined in
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360 (MeKinney 1968). Throughout the Comment the terms
"symbol," "insignia," and "mark" are used interchangeably with the term "tradesymbol."
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1938 decision of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins92 and the passage in 1946
of the Lanham Act.

3

Prior to Erie, which decreed the abolition of

federal general common law, trademark and unfair competition principles were a developed body of both federal and state common law.

The Erie decision, at least in theory, mandated that all future unfair
competition and trademark actions be decided on the basis of state
law. 94 With the passage of the Lanham Act, however, federal law was

severed from the state law of unfair competition. The Act "put federal
trademark law on a new footing"9' 5 by affording federal registrants a

variety of rights otherwise unobtainable. 9 Marks not federally registered 97 or not federally registrable 9 are protectable only to the extent
of state law. The balance of this Comment is directed towards New

York State law.
The protection of trade-symbols through trademark law or mis-

representation doctrine is grounded on the assumption that imitation
of plaintiff's insignia will confuse consumers as to the origin of goods

or services and thereby cause the trade-symbol holder loss of trade. Two
interests are thus protected: those of trade-symbol holders, which are of

course central, and those of consumers, which are protected incidentally.99 The distinction between those symbols protected under trademark law and those protected under the unfair competition doctrine of

misrepresentation'

°

is largely formal. Moreover, the extent of protec-

92. 304 U.S. 64 (1948).
93. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1949).
94. Notwithstanding the Erie decision there seems to be a federal common law
of unfair competition.
I]he issue is really whether we shall apply our regurgitation of the state redistillation of federal precedents or go more directly and realistically to the
sources themselves. Actually . . . we have never found any difference in ultimate result, and so quite often lump federal and New York law together...
or-even more conveniently-eschew all reference to the matter.
Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir.
1956) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
95. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1949).
96. E.g., incontestability of right to use the mark under certain circumstances, 15
U.S.C. § 1065 (1970); potentially nationwide rights through the constructive notice
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970).
97. The process for obtaining federal registration is described in 15 U.S.C. § 1051
(1970).
98. Among the substantive prerequisites to federal registration are that the applicant "own" the mark and that the mark be used in interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. §
1051 (1970).
99. E.g., Coming Glass Works v. Coming Cut Glass Co., 197 N.Y. 173, 179, 90
N.E. 449, 450 (1910).
100. Misrepresentation is only one component of the many "unfair practices"
proscribed by unfair competition law. Other proscribed practices include misappropriation, theft of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contract. See generally
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tion afforded by the two is largely coextensive. Trademarks generally refer to symbols which are registered, although this need not be the case.10 '
The traditional requirement for the registration of a symbol as a trademark is that the symbol be arbitrary with respect to the good with
which it is associated. 10 2 Insignia which have this characteristic are
sometimes referred to as "technical" trademarks. A symbol which fails
to meet the criterion of arbitrariness may nevertheless become protected
from deceptive imitation if it has acquired what is referred to as secondary meaning: "The theory of the secondary meaning simply 'contemplates that a word or phrase originally ... incapable of exclusive
appropriation with reference to an article in the market, because [it is]
descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in that trade
and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had
come to mean that the article was his product .... ,103 The doctrine
of secondary meaning has become so well established that both New
York and federal law have largely extinguished the distinction between
technical trademarks and symbols which have acquired a secondary
meaning. In New York, a mark otherwise unregistrable may be registered upon a showing that it "has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods or services,"' 0 4 i.e., that it has acquired a secondary meaning. Five
years continual use of a symbol as a mark constitutes prima facie evidence of distinctiveness. 0 5 A symbol which has acquired secondary
meaning receives the same protection as a "technical" trademark.
New York has two major statutory codes dealing with the protection of trade-symbols: Article 24 of the General Business Law'0 6 codifies
and extends the common law; Article 17-B of the General Business
Law'07 provides for public action by the Attorney General in the case
of consumer deception. In addition, several other statutes either explicitly or implicitly afford protection to trade-symbols. 0 8 This ComS. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION:
CASES AND COMMENTS (3d ed. 1974).
101. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360 (McKinney 1968).
102. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 361 (McKinney 1968).

103. Hotel Syracuse, Inc. v. Motel Syracuse, Inc., 283 App. Div. 182, 185, 127
N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (4th Dep't 1954) (authors' omissions).
104. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 361 (McKinney 1968).
105. Id. Other proof of distinctiveness may be acceptable.
106. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 360-368-e et seq. (McKinney 1968).
107. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 279-i to -q (McKinney 1968).
108. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 397 (McKinney 1968) (generally providingthat commercial use of the name or mark of a nonprofit organization without permission
is a misdemeanor); N.Y. CGv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1968) (providing.
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ment is limited to an examination of the statutory and common law of
private civil actions for trademark infringement and misrepresentation.
The following section describes, in broad terms, the operation of Article
24 of the General Business Law; subsequent sections treat New York's
summary proceeding 0 9 and product repackaging" 0 statutes.
1. Article 24 of the General Business Law-An Overview. Article
24, subheaded Trade-marks, Service-marks, and Business Reputation,
has four major aspects: (1) registration and cancellation of marks, (2)
a definition of infringement, (3) an anti-dilution provision, and (4)
explicit and implicit recognition of common law rights. The registration provision, while parallel in content to the corresponding section
of the Lanham Act,"' yields a state registrant no substantive rightsthat is, the state registration affords no rights, actions, or remedies,
which would be unavailable in the absence of registration. Registration may, however, serve an evidentiary function"12 or form the basis
for later federal registration."13
Section 368-b" 4 defines infringement of a registered mark. It operates in conjunction with section 368-c,"r5 the remedy provision, subthat the unauthorized commercal use of an individual's name or picture is a misdemeanor
and, additionally, is civilly actionable for equitable relief and damages).
109. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 133 (McKinney 1968).
110. N.Y. GFN. Bus. LAw § 279-n(6) (McKinney 1968).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1970).
112. Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The New York Approach to the
Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices, 53 CORNELL L. Rav. 749, 763 (1968); cf.
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 228, 188
N.Y.S.2d 132 (3d Dep't 1959).
113. State registration may establish the "ownership" requirement of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051 (1970).
114. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-b (McKinney 1968) provides:
Subject to the provisions of section three hundred sixty-eight-e hereof any person who shall
(a) use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a mark registered under this article in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake
or to deceive as to the source or origin of such goods or services; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be
used upon or in conjunction with the sale or other distribution in this state
of such goods or services; shall be liable to a civil action by the owner of such
registered mark for any or all of the remedies provided in section three hundred sixty-eight-e, hereof, except that under subsection (b) hereof the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have
been committed with knowledge that such mark is intended to be used to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
115. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-c (McKinney 1968) provides:
1. Any owner of a mark registered under this article may proceed by suit
to enjoin the manufacture, use, display or sale of any counterfeits or imitations
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ject to the existence of any common law rights which are specifically
preserved in section 368-e.118 Sections 368-b and 368-c generally provide
for enjoining of the infringer in the case of either actual use or intent
to use the infringing mark. Additionally, an infringer may be subjected
to liability for profits or damages if the mark is actually used or, if it is
not used but is imitated with the intention of causing confusion, mistake, or deception. Section 368-d' 17 provides for injunctive relief in
the case of injury to business reputation or in the case of dilution of the
distinctiveness of the mark. Section 368-d is a broad provision which is
indicative of legislative condemnation of a variety of "unfair" business
practices. Its recognition of "injury to business reputation" is an implicit continuation of general common law rights classified under the
rubric of unfair competition. The section's anti-dilution provision,
whose operation is detailed in a separate section of this Comment, 18
is an expansion of the common law.
2. Elements of the Action. The two elements which comprise a
claim for trademark infringement or unfair competition misrepresentation require that the plaintiff establish (1) that the mark has become
an indicia of origin of the good, and (2) that use by the defendant is
likely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods." 9 However
simply stated, these elements have often proved difficult to apply. The
court of appeals has remarked that
aside from the broad and well-established principles, not only is
precedent difficult to ascertain, but in many instances the decisions
thereof and any court of competent jurisdiction may grant injunctions to restrain such manufacture, use, display or sale as may be by the said court

deemed just and reasonable, and may require the defendants to pay to such
owner all profits derived from and/or all damages suffered by reason of such
wrongful manufacture, use, display or sale; and such court may also order that

any such counterfeits or imitations in the possession or under the control of
any defendant in such case, be delivered to an officer of the court, or to the

complainant, to be destroyed.
2. The enumeration of any right or remedy herein shall not affect a registrant's right to prosecute under any penal law of this state.

116. N.Y. GEN. Bus.

LAW

§ 368-e (McKinney 1968) provides: "Nothing herein

shall adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of rights in marks acquired in good

faith at any time at common law."
117. N.Y.

GEN.

Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1968) provides: "Likelihood of

injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade
name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered:
or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
services."
118. See text accompanying notes 181-195 infra.

119. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-b (McKinney 1968); Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d 847, 855-57, 340 N.Y.S.2d.

532, 543-45 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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seem incompatible.... [T]he emphasis...
seems to have been placed
20

upon the fact pattern of each situation.

3. Secondary Meaning-Is It Necessary?

In the case of an arbitrary or coined symbol the rationale for protection is straightforward: "given the infinite variety of symbols . . .
available for adoption by defendant, his decision to use the facsimile in
the sale of goods or services competing with plaintiff's could only have
been motivated by an intent to deceive.' 21 Non-arbitrary terms, ordinarily incapable of appropriation because they are in the public
domain, will nevertheless be protected from deceptive imitation if the
plaintiff can establish secondary meaning. In Eastern Construction Co.
v. Eastern Engineering Corp.,122 for example, the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the defendant, a later user who operated the same type of
business as plaintiff, from utilizing the term "Eastern" in its corporate
name. While denying relief because the likelihood of confusion was not
established, 1 23 the court of appeals held that the absence of fancifulness,
the nominal requirement for a technical trademark, was inconsequential.124 If the plaintiff had established in the relevant consumer market
an exclusive association between the term "Eastern" and itself as a
corporate entity, then the geographic term would be eligible for protection from deceptive imitation.125 The court indicated that good faith
would not establish a defense because proof of intent was not a requisite to the action: "The courts have never found difficulty in protecting
the public and the owner of the good will of a business against the deceptive use of a name even though that name was originally chosen
without wrongful purpose. '' 126
New York has developed a line of misrepresentation cases which
deviate from the mainstream by purporting to grant relief even in the
absence of secondary meaning. This may have resulted from a judicial
failure to distinguish between misrepresentation and misappropriation,
but the ramifications suggested by the cases discussed below have arguably enlarged the scope of trade-symbol protection. The case which
120. Dell Publishing Co. v. Stanley Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 133, 172
N.E.2d 656, 660, 211 N.Y.S.2d 393, 399 (1961).
121. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADnESARx AND RELATED STATE DoaTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS 107 (1973).

122. 246 N.Y. 459, 159 N.E. 397 (1927).
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

464,159 N.E.at 399.
463, 159 N.E. at 398.
462-63, 159 N.E. at 398.
463, 159 N.E. at 398-99.

1975]

UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

initiated this change in the law, Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling,2 7
involved a relatively simple factual situation. Plaintiff, beginning in
1949, operated an amusement area known as "Santa's Workshop" in
the Adirondack Mountains. Defendant operated two establishments
advertised as "Nature's Magnificent Killers," one of which was on a
route which persons coming from the west towards plaintiff's establishment would often traverse. After the plaintiff began advertising its
establishment, the defendant dropped the name previously used arxd
advertised under various names, all of which referred to "Santa" or
"Saint Nick." In denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the appellate
division held that "the law of unfair competition no longer requires
that the plaintiff's business and advertising shall have acquired a 'secondary meaning." 28 Because the complaint alleged wrongs sounding in
two distinct types of unfair competition-a misrepresentation action
("the defendant by his conduct is 'palming off' his business as that of
the plaintiff") and a misappropriation action ("the defendant has
mimicked plaintiff's ideas, and 'plagiarized' plaintiff's advertising") 129
-the precise basis for the holding is unclear. Similarly, in Avon Periodicals, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.,' 30 the court held that where
the defendant closely imitated plaintiff's comic book cover and format,
an injunction against using the word "Eerie" in the title would issue
notwithstanding the absence of a demonstrated secondary meaning in
the work. Again, the basis for the decision was. not fully explained
because elements of both misrepresentation and misappropriation were
present: "We think that the adoption by defendant of the title 'Eerie,'
the same as that previously employed by plaintiff, in a magazine which
also so closely duplicated the size, format, design and illustrated cover
of plaintiff's magazine in the same 'comic' field was bound to be confusing and constituted unfair competition."'' 1
These and similar cases' 32 have injected no small amount of confusion into the law. In Speedry Products v. Dri Mark Products,Inc.,' s

plaintiff maintained that New York courts had eliminated the require127. 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3d Dep't 1953), motion to dismiss
denied, aff'd on other grounds, 2 App. Div. 2d 262, 153 N.Y.S.2d 839 (3d Dep't 1956).
128. 282 App. Div. at 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89 (3d Dep't 1953).
129. Id. at 327, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89.
130. 27 Misc. 2d 160, 113 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div.
200, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1st Dep't 1953).
131. 282 App. Div. 200, 201, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (1st Dep't 1953).
132. E.g., Catalina, Inc. v. Ganis, 207 Misc. 1068, 142 N.Y.S. 65 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Murray v. Miller, 142 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 3 App. Div. 2d 1008, 164
N.Y.S.2d. 257 (lst Dep't 1957).
133. 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959).
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ment of secondary meaning in unfair competition actions. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals sought to clarify the matter by distinguishing
'between misrepresentation and misappropriation as sub-categories of
unfair competition. The court noted that the problem arose from the
fact that, while secondary meaning is not necessary in misappropriation
cases,

134

courts in misrepresentation actions have occasionally used the

more inclusive term of unfair competition. 35 The opinion went on to
discuss the Santa's Workshop case in some detail and offered two alternative explanations for that holding. The court suggested that the
New York court might have determined that secondary meaning attached "immediately... in the minds of the public travelling in that
area."' 13 That is, despite the language of the Santa's Workshop opinion,
which stated that secondary meaning was no longer necessary to an
unfair competition action, secondary meaning had in fact been established. 137 The court also noted that the defendant in Speedry Products
had "demonstrate[d] the type of predatory business conduct that a court
of equity will enjoin whether or not there has been a showing of secondary meaning."'138 The Second Circuit took the opportunity to elaborate
its position in Norwich Pharmacal v. Sterling Drug, Inc.13 That
opinion makes it clear that the plaintiff must show that the defendant
engaged in some predatory business practice if it is to prevail without
establishing secondary meaning.140 Of the three types of proscribed
134. Id. at 648-50.
135. See note 100 supra.
Because misappropriation has, almost from the beginning, been a vital element
in unfair competition's basic passing off formula, most jurisdictions weigh it in
combination with the formula's other elements, particularly deception. New
York is alone among the states only in the extent to which it endorses misappropriation as an independent ground for recovery. Like the question of deception,
the question of appropriation is one of degree ....
P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 121, at 109.
136. 271 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1959).
137. But the state court's holding that there could be a cause of action even absent
secondary meaning arose on the appellate division's affirmation of a denial of defendanes motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The facts which the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals read as possibly causing a sub silentio finding of
secondary meaning, were therefore only alleged, not established, at the time of the appellate division's pronouncement. This tends to cut against the plausibility of the theory.
138. 271 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1959). One possible justification for this result,
although the court did not explicitly advert to it, is that when the defendant inten.
tionally engages in a deceptive trade practice, there is a presumption of likelihood of
confusion regardless of a showing of secondary meaning. See note 168 inIra & accompanying text. The facts in Santa's Workshop strongly suggest that the defendant intentionally sought to deceive the public.
139. 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959).
140.
[A] court of equity will restrain such practices as constitute palming off,
actual deception or appropriation of another's property ....
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practices enumerated in the Norwich opinion-palming off, actual
deception, and violation of plaintiff's property rights-the third sounds
in misappropriation while the first two, sounding in misrepresentation,
arguably require the establishment of secondary meaning. 141 A defendant could not misrepresent its goods or services as those of another
-that is, deceive consumers as to source of origin-unless consumers
had already associated the term with a particular source, i.e., unless
secondary meaning had attached to the term. This possible flaw in the
rationale notwithstanding, the court's holding has been consistently
followed: 1 42 "[T]he first comer may prevail if he proves secondary
meaning plus likelihood of confusion on the one hand or that the
second comer has indulged in one of the proscribed practices which
equity will enjoin, on the other."' 43 This theory ignores the theoretical
precision of separating misappropriation from misrepresentation'"
and of obviating the showing of secondary meaning only in the former.
It does, however, explicitly favor a more comprehensive protection of
the senior user's interest. One possible explanation for this development
is that the doctrinal restrictions of misrepresentation actions are too
rigid to proscribe certain types of unethical market place behavior.
Traditional misrepresentation doctrine operates under the assumption
that no economic harm accrues to the senior user until and unless
consumers are deceived (causing the diversion of trade). The more
general proscription of "unfair practices," on the other hand, is a
remedy that recognizes that the senior user may suffer economic harm
from actions which fall beyond the reach of simple misrepresentation.
These same considerations, discussed earlier, led to the development
of misappropriation doctrine as a separate and distinct cause of action. 45
4. Likelihood of Confusion. Once the plaintiff has established that
In cases where the New York courts have occasionally granted relief without proof of secondary meaning, one of the aforementioned predatory practices
was established ....
Id. at 571.
141. The difference, if any, between "palming off" and "actual deception" is
not stated in the opinion. One possibility is that "palming off" requires the standard
of "likelihood of confusion." See text accompanying notes 146-154 infra. If actual deception has occurred as a result of the imitation, a conclusive presumption of the likelihood of confusion will result.
142. E.g., Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 698 (2d
Cir. 1961); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir.

1964).
143. 271 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1959).
144. See notes 9 & 43 sufpra. See generally Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized

Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1964).
145. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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the symbol is an indicium of origin of a particular good-either by
presumption, if the symbol is arbitrary, or through the acquisition of
secondary meaning (subject to the considerations developed in the
preceding section), if the symbol, is non-arbitrary-it must further
show that imitation by the defendant is likely to cause confusion among
consumers. This standard does not require a showing that actual deception has occurred, although such a showing may be probative of
the likelihood of confusion. 146 The first issue then, is a threshold
determination of the relevant consumer market, although more often
than not the decisions leave this determination implicit. A classic case
which demonstrates the importance of market definition is Bayer Co.
v. United Drug Co. 47 In that case the plaintiff, after the expiration of
its patent on aspirin (tablets of acetyl salicylic acid), sought to enjoin
the defendant from use of the term "Aspirin" in connection with the
sale of tablets of acetyl salicylic acid of the latter's manufacture. The
defendant interposed the defense that the term had become generic,
i.e., that in the minds of consumers it referred to the type of good,
rather than to a good particularly associated with the plaintiff. Judge
Learned Hand, after reviewing the evidence, concluded that
[t]he trade is divided into two classes, separated by vital differences.
One, the manufacturing chemists, retail druggists, and physicians,
has been educated to understand that "Aspirin" means the plaintiff's
manufacture ....
The other, the consumer, the plaintiff has ...
allowed to acquaint themselves with the drug only by the name
"Aspirin," and has not succeeded in advising that the word means
the plaintiff at all.148
With this finding Judge Hand was able to issue a bifurcated injunction
which protected the plaintiff in the first consumer market but not in
149
the second.
New York courts have similarly withheld relief absent a likelihood
of confusion in the pertinent consumer market. In Eastern Construction Co. v. EasternEngineering Co.1 0 both plaintiff and defendant were
146. See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League,
72 Misc. 2d 847, 856-57, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 544-45 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
147. 272 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
148. Id. at 513.
149. The decree, in pertinent part, enjoined the defendant:
Against using the word "Aspirin" . . . in any sales of "acetyl salicylic acid"
to manufacturing chemists, wholesaler or retail druggists, or physicians. The

defendant will be free to sell "acetyl salicylic acid" direct to consumers under
the name "Aspirin" without suffix or qualification ....
Id. at 515.

150. 246 N.Y. 459, 159 N.E. 397 (1927).
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in the construction industry and both bid on contracts for public
buildings. The court of appeals concluded that sufficient confusion did
not exist to warrant the issuance of an injunction.
[N]ot all persons constantly exercise caution in their daily affairs, and
a merchant may be injured by deception of the incautious and unwary
among his customers. [But] [t]he nature of the business in which the
defendant competes with the plaintiff reduces almost to the vanishing
point the possibility of deception and damage in this case. 5 '
12
Similarly, in FederatedPurchaser,Inc. v. FederatedElectronics,Inc., r
where the defendant was a manufacturer and wholesaler of electronic
components and the plaintiff was a retailer of radio, television and
sound products, the court refused to enjoin the defendant from using
a tradename which resembled plaintiff's. The opinion held, inter alia,
that although both companies were in the same general field, each
catered to different classes of purchasers, and so the likelihood of confusion was insubstantial.
Within the relevant consumer market the test applied "is whether
the resemblance [of the symbols] is such that it is calculated to deceive,
and does in fact deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases
under the ordinary conditions which prevail in the conduct of the particular traffic to which the controversy relates."' 15 3 In practice this
amounts to a rule of reason which distinguishes errors and mistakes on
the one hand from induced confusion on the other. Thus in North
Country Community Hospital v. North Shore Hospital,54 the court
concluded that "mistakes in addressing and delivering of goods and
mail and in the drawing and processing of checks"' 155 were careless
errors not owing to the similarity of names. Likewise, in Hotel Syracuse
v. Motel Syracuse, 1r6 where the evidence showed some misdirected mail,
the court withheld relief on the ground that carelessness, not confusion,
was responsible for the errors.
If the likelihood of confusion is dissipated by use of a suitable

151. Id. at 464, 159 N.E. at 399. See also Renofab Process Corp. v. Renotex
Corp., 158 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
152. 34 Misc. 2d 108, 228 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d
795, 236 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1st Dep't 1963).
153. Fisher v. Blank, 138 N.Y. 244, 252, 33 N.E. 1040, 1041 (1893) (emphasis

added).
154. 128 N.Y.S.2d- 168 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 1074, 131 N.Y.S.2d
900 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 207 N.Y. 887, 123 N.E.2d 87 (1954).
155. 128 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
156. 283 App. Div. 182, 127 N.Y.S.2d 485 (4th Dep't 1954), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 831,
130 N.E.2d 620 (1955).
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disclaimer or other disassociation, then no action will lie. In Pocket
Books, Inc. v. Meyers,157 where the defendant imitated the style, size
and format of plaintiff's pocket-sized books, the court held that "fairness in competition required of the defendants that their reprints convey to the purchasing public information which identified their product
and reasonably distinguished it from that of the plaintiff,"1 8 and that
the conspicuous placement of defendant's name and insignia on the
covers of their books satisfied this duty. If, however, the disclaimer is
of the "fine print" variety, courts have not hesitated in finding the disassociation insufficient and have ordered injunctive relief.',, In some
instances the use of a disclaimer or disassociating prefix may actually
exacerbate the defendant's legal problems. In the case of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League,160 plaintiffs, as appropriators of the symbol "ADL" sought to enjoin defendants
from use of the symbol "AADL". In reaching the conclusion that a
likelihood of confusion existed the court treated defendant's disclaimer
as an admission of the likelihood of confusion: "The defendant executive director's disclaimer and caution in his newspaper Action that
'Arab Anti-Defamation League not to be confused or identified with
B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League' explaining '[t]his statement has
been made in order to prevent any possible confusion that might arise
as the result of some similarity in the names of the two organizations,'
is 'pregnant with admission' . . . .,"161 The court treated the effect of
the addition of the ethnic prefix in a similar fashion: "The addition
of the infringer's name to another's tradename with a strong secondary
meaning, as in the case at bar, may be deemed an 'aggravation and not
a justification, for it is openly trading in the name of another upon the
reputation acquired by the device of the true proprietor'....,102
An interesting situation arises when, at the time of suit, there is no
present likelihood of confusion between plaintiff and defendant, but,
because of such factors as anticipated business expansion, future con157. 292 N.Y. 58, 54 N.E.2d 6 (1944).
158. Id. at 62, 54 N.E.2d at 8.
159. "The insertion by the defendants in small
'masthead' of their second and subsequent issues, of a
the plaintiff is not adequate notice to the public, nor
action for injunctive relief." New York World's Fair

print, on the inside pages, in the
disclaimer of any connection with
does it constitute a defense to an
1939, Inc. v. World's Fair News,

Inc., 163 Misc. 661, 666, 297 N.Y.S. 923, 929 (Sup. Ct. 1937), af'd, 256 App. Div.
373, 10 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1939). See also Bennett Brothers, Inc. v. Floyd Bennett

Farmers Mkt. Corp., 22 Misc. 2d 833, 837, 197 N.Y.S.2d 882, 887 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
160. 72 Misc. 2d 847, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
161. Id. at 857, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
162. Id. at 857, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
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fusion is probable. 163 In Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg,164 the plaintiff had established, beginning in 1909, a chain of wholesale and retail
grocery stores, each of which contained the word "Victory" in its
tradename (e.g., "Victory Market," "Victory Supermarket"). During
the years 1909-1942, the plaintiff's operations expanded through much
of the central New York region. The defendant, in 1942, without any
knowledge of plaintiff's existence, opened a grocery store named "Victory Supermarket, Inc.," in a county which, while containing none
of plaintiff's stores, was adjacent to counties in which plaintiff transacted business and which was in the probable path of expansion of
plaintiff's business. The court held that because the plaintiff was the
prior appropriator and because the defendant, at the time of the assumption of the name, was within the zone of expansion, the defendant
would be enjoined from using the word "Victory."'01 5 This holding
finds some support in other cases, but the remedy provided, an absolute
injunction, goes beyond that usually granted."'
5. Consequences of Intent. Typically a cause of action for misrepresentation or trademark infringement will lie without the plaintiff being
67
required to prove that the defendant intended to deceive consumers.
If, however, the plaintiff does show that the defendant chose the symbol with the intention of trading upon the plaintiff's goodwill, then
the likelihood of confusion may be presumed even absent a showing
of secondary meaning. 1 8 In certain circumstances a court will infer
163. A related case occurs when there is no present likelihood of confusion because
the parties sell different types of goods. In Peerless Elec. Co. v. Peerless Elec., Inc., 206
Misc. 965, 135 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1954), the plaintiff, senior user of the name,
manufactured and sold electric motors while the defendant sold electric cooking appliances. The court found it a "likelihood" that the natural "product expansion" of the
two businesses would bring them into competition and enjoined the defendant from
use of the name.
The "geographic expansion" of Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 10 Misc. 2d 382,
174 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1958), and the "product expansion" of Peerless Electric
principles underline the interdependency between the likelihood of confusion and competition (see text accompanying notes 146-56 supra & 173-180 infra) principles of
unfair competition. Where there is no competition between the parties the likelihood
of confusion is usually marginal. The grant of relief on an "expansion" theory "reserves" for the senior user the right to use the mark approximately commensurate with
the foreseeable business growth, either geographically or through product diversification.
164. 10 Misc. 2d 382, 174 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
165. Id. at 387, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
166. E.g., Food Center, Inc. v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 356 F.2d 775 (1st Cir.
1966).
167. An important exception of this occurs when the plaintiff seeks to invoke summary proceedings. See notes 196-209 infra & accompanying text.
168. In Eastern Construction Co. v. Eastern Engineering Corp., 246 N.Y. 459, 465,
159 N.E. 397, 399 (1927), the court of appeals stated:
If inference could be drawn that the defendant had chosen the name
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such intent from the defendant's actions. 1 9 In Pharmaceuticals.Inc. v.
United Whelan Corp., where the use of the symbol was combined with

a "studied imitation" of plaintiff's product and/or product package,
the court granted injunctive relief. 70 In that case the plaintiff produced

"Sominex," a sleeping pill, and "Geritol," a "tired blood" supplement while the defendant manufactured "Somnifac" and "Getrin,"
two products with respectively the same medicinal purposes as plaintiff's. Regarding "Sominex"/"Somnifac," the court found both terms
generic (from the Latin "somnus" meaning "to sleep") and that secondary meaning had not adhered to plaintiff's term. Nevertheless,
because defendant's bottles, labels and pills substantially matched the

size, design, color, and print of plaintiff's, the court held that injunctive relief was appropriate:
It is the combination of features as a whole... which must determine whether the competing product is likely to cause confusion in the
mind of the public.
The plaintiff is clearly entitled to relief in view of what appears to
be the deliberate copying by the defendants of the salient features of
the plaintiff's product "Sominex," for the purpose of obtaining for its
product the benefits of the advertising and the public demand for
"Sominex."1171
On the alleged unfair competition of "Getrin" with "Geritol," however, the court found for the defendant. Both terms, being derivatives
. . with intent to derive benefit from it at expense of the plaintiff, our conclusion might be different ....
In such case the defendant may be in no
position to deny the existence of such probability [of trading upon the plaintiff's
goodwill] when asserted by the plaintiff.
This dicta was used as the basis for a later holding that where
the acts of defendants were calculated to deliberately simulate and imitate
plaintiff's trade practices and techniques ....
. . . [I]t [was] unnecessary to determine whether the prohibited word ...
[had] acquired a secondary meaning.
Industrial Plants Corp. v. Industrial Liquidating Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 34, 162 N.Y.S.2d
404, 405 (1st Dep't), reargument and appeal denied, 3 App. Div. 2d 1005, 165
N.Y.S.2d 432 (lst Dep't 1957); cf. John Forsythe Co. v. Forsythe Shoe Corp., 234 App.
Div. 355, 254 N.Y.S. 584 (1st Dep't 1932); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., 147 Misc.
679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
In addition, the plaintiff's remedies may be strengthened if it can show intent on
the part of the defendant. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 368-b, 368-c (McKinney 1968).
For the text of these sections, see notes 114 & 115 supra,
169. "The whole conduct of the defendants furnishes convincing evidence that the
defendants were seeking to appropriate the plaintiffs trade-name and business .... "
Nu Enamel Corp. v. Nate Enamel Co., Inc., 243 App. Div. 292, 293, 276 N.Y.S. 930,
932 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 268 N.Y. 574, 198 N.E. 411 (1935); cf. New York World's
Fair 1939, Inc. v. World's Fair News, Inc., 163 Misc. 661, 663, 297 N.Y.S. 923, 928
(Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 373, 10 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1939).
170. 22 Misc. 2d 532, 197 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
171. Id. at 534-35, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
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of "geriatrics" (the field of medicine dealing with problems of old
age), were descriptive of the products. In this instance, however, secondary meaning had not attached to plaintiff's product nor had the
defendant sufficiently imitated it to suggest an intention to deceive.
The case is instructive because while two symbols were copied, and
secondary meaning had not attached to either, injunctive relief was
granted for one. The difference in result seems to hinge upon the proof
172
of intent.
6. Competition Between the Parties-Is It Necessary?'7" Traditionally, it was indispensable to the success of an unfair competition
action that the parties stand in a competitive relationship. In Corning
Glass Works v. Corning Cut Glass Co.,174 for instance, the plaintiff

sought to enjoin the defendant from use of a similar name in connection with its business in cut glass. Plaintiff's sole competitive interest
in the cut glass trade was in the sale of glass blanks, used in making
cut glass products, to two firms which competed with the defendant in
the sale of cut glass finished products. The court found that cut glass
manufacture constituted a distinct line of trade and that as between
the plaintiff and defendant there was no competitive relationship.
Predicated on that finding, which carried with it the implication that
plaintiff suffered no economic harm (since no trade was being diverted), the court denied plaintiff relief.1 75
Later cases assumed a different posture. In Long's Hat Stores Corp.
v. Long's Clothes, Inc.,' 76 the plaintiff had established a retail business
172. It should be pointed out that while this appears to be a correct interpretation of the case, some of the language in the opinion is confusing and other interpretations are possible.
Oakite Products, Inc. v. Boritz, 161 Misc. 807, 293 N.Y.S. 399 (Sup. Ct. 1936),
was another case where imitation of numerous elements apparently gave rise to a presumption of intent:
Defendants' package ...was made up of many elements: the name "Borite,"
the shape and size of the package and the design and color thereof. That the
package was designed as a whole in a deliberate attempt to simulate that of
plaintiff cannot be doubted. The defendants cannot assert that although they
may have unfairly copied plaintiff's package, their adoption of the name "Borite"
was in good faith.
Id. at 809, 293 N.Y.S. at 403. See also Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 72 Misc.
2d 757, 340 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
173. See generally Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 95 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 443 (1947); Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv.
L. Rnv. 813 (1927); Annot., 148 A.L.R. 12, 78-92 (1944). See also Cornell University
v. Messing Bakeries, 135 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. 1954), judgment modified, 285 App.
Div. 490, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't 1955).
174. 197 N.Y. 173, 90 N.E. 449 (1910).
175. Id. at 178-80, 90 N.E. at 450-51.
176. 224 App. Div. 497, 231 N.Y.S. 107 (lst Dep't 1928).
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selling hats and haberdashery, although prior to the action it had discontinued its clothing line. Defendant subsequently opened a clothing
store under a name similar to plaintiff's. The trial court refused to
issue an injunction since the companies sold different classes of merchandise. The appellate division reversed, holding: "[p]laintiff ... is
entitled to be protected not only from direct competition, but from
any injury which might result to it from the deception of the public
through the unauthorized use of its tradename, or a trade-name which
would lead the public to believe that it was in some way connected
with plaintiff." 177 This holding was buttressed in Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions,Inc.,y78 a case which may be read as overruling sub
silentio the competition requirement articulated in Corning. In this
case the plaintiff was well known and widely respected in the jewelry
trade while the defendant company was engaged in the unrelated business of motion picture production and distribution. The court, holding
for plaintiff, noted the judicial trend towards finding unfair competition
in the absence of competition under similar circumstances7 0 and
adopted both that position and its theoretical basis: "The real injury
in such cases of noncompetitive products is the gradual whittling away
or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the
mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.'1 8 0
Thus the expansion of the common law of unfair competition to
encompass instances of "unfair" practices even in the absence of a
competitive relationship finds its theoretical underpinning in recognition of the fact that the plaintiff may suffer economic harm even if
there is no apparent diversion of trade. This evolution in the common
law was taken to its logical conclusion in the form of an anti-dilution
statute, considered in the following section.
B. Additional Statutory Protection
1. Anti-Dilution-General Business Law Section 368-d.28 Judicial cognizance of a compensable injury based on defendant's imitation
177. Id. at 498, 231 N.Y.S. at 108. But the

opinion

also specified that the articles

sold by the two companies were in the same general class of goods, so that given its
narrowest interpretation this case did not dispense with the necessity of showing competition.
178. 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260

N.Y.S. 821 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y.482, 188 N.E.30 (1933).
179. The majority relied on, inter alia, Forsythe Co. v. Forsythe Shoe Corp., 234
App.Div. 355, 254 N.Y.S. 584 (1st Dep't 1932) and Long's Hat Stores Corp. v. Long's
Clothes, Inc., 224 App.Div.497, 231 N.Y.S. 107 (lst Dep't 1928).

180. 147 Misc. at 681, 264 N.Y.S. at 462 (Sup.Ct. 1932).
181. The text of the statute iscontained in note 117 supra.
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of plaintiff's symbol in the absence of competition and/or the likelihood of confusion has a history which dates back at least half a century.8 2 In New York that principle has been codified in an anti-dilu83
tion statute.
The theory of dilution protection has been variously thought to
rest upon the possibility of tarnishment of plaintiff's mark, confusion
of sponsorship, or the mere loss of distinctiveness. One frequently
cited proposition holds that the distinctiveness of a plaintiff's mark is
slowly eroded by defendant's continual use and that this erosion constitutes a trespass to the property right plaintiff possesses in the mark. 8 4
The present New York statutory formulation, as it reads, provides for
injunctive relief even in the absence of competition or confusion.
Judicial interpretation, however, has significantly vitiated the force
of that language.
The leading New York case interpreting this provision is Cue
Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.' s5 In that case the plaintiff
published under the federal and state registered trademark "Cue," an
entertainment guide entitled "Cue Magazine." The defendant, a
manufacturer of soaps, detergents, toiletries and other products, had
periodically marketed toiletry items in several parts of the country
under the name "Cue." When defendant marketed a toothpaste under
the "Cue" name, plaintiff commenced suit, alleging, inter alia, dilution of its trademark. The court restricted the application of the statute
by holding that "some measure of confusion must be present."' 8 6 Furthermore, the court stated that while plaintiff had demonstrated that
the mark possessed ordinary secondary meaning, the statute was con182. The court in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d 847, 860 n.6, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 548 n.7 (Sup. Ct. 1972),
credits a 1924 German case for first articulating a dilution theory, and Schechter's article,
note 173 supra, for advancing the theory in the United States.
183. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1968). For the text of this section,
see note 27 supra.
184. See, e.g., G. B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. Lorillard, 114 F. Supp. 621, 630-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.
1963), found that the injury caused by dilution
differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion .... Such
confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.
Id. at 836.
185. 45 Misc. 2d 161, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d
829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't 1965).
186. But see United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Amtex Fabrics, Inc., 29 Misc. 2d
86, 87, 212 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1961) which states that "defendant's contention that . . .no confusion can arise, even if correct, in its assumptions is neither determinative nor persuasive" for purposes of evaluating a cause of action under the antidilution statute.
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strued to require more: the court held that the mark must be "distinctive." Finally, the court noted that the stature and reputation of
the defendant indicated that there was no attempt to trade on plaintiff's goodwill. Thus in at least three respects the court limited the
breadth of the provision. In a per curiam opinion the appellate division affirmed the trial court, cryptically stating that "the evidence
failed to establish a sufficient likelihood or injury of the distinctive
quality of the plaintiff's trade mark .... ,,"187
The restrictiveness of judicial interpretation of section 368-d is
emphasized in cases involving a plaintiff seeking dilution protection
where its sole registration is federal and the suit is based on a Lanham
Act violation joined with a related unfair competition claim. Two
early cases had held that the plaintiff must possess a state registration
in order to invoke dilution protection,'"8 but those cases were decided
under a predecessor statute to section 368-d which expressly required
state registration. 8 9 The dilution provision was amended in 1965 and
now allows dilution protection regardless of registration. While several cases involving the stated facts have been decided after 1965 none
have granted the plaintiff dilution relief. In King Research, Inc. v.
Shulton, Inc., 90 and Laverne International,Ltd. v. American Institute
of Interior Decorators,Inc.,191 the courts, relying on the Cue Publishing interpretation of the statute, denied relief because the plaintiffs
were unable to show "some confusion, fraud, deception or palming
off.' 92 In National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co. 1 3
the court briefly discussed the dilution aspects of the case but made
no determination because injunctive relief was granted on the Lanham
Act violation. Only in Exquisite Form Industries, Inc. v. Exquisite
Fabrics of London' 94 did a court acknowledge the contradiction between the language of the anti-dilution statute and its construction
by lower state and federal courts. Even here the court merely noted
the absence of any definitive interpretation by the state's highest court
187. 23 App. Div. 2d 829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (1st Dep't 1965). See also
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d
847, 860-61, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 548-49 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
188. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir.
1959); Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 614 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
189.
190.
191.
192.
1971).
193.
194.

Laws of N.Y. [1961] ch. 583.
324 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
353 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
353 F. Supp. 659, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 324 F. Supp. 631, 639 (S.D.N.Y.
376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
378 F. Supp. 403, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
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or by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 195 and then acquiesced to
the weight of Cue Publishingand subsequent precedent.
It is evident, therefore, that courts, in applying the anti-dilution
provision, have been substantially restrained by the Cue Publishing
holding. That case appears to stand for the propositions that (1) there
must be some likelihood of confusion; (2) the symbol must be arbitrary
or if nonarbitrary must have acquired a strong secondary meaning;
and, (3) in some cases an evaluation of the defendant's intention may
be determinative. Whether this comports with the legislative intent
and statutory language has thus far not been tested in either the state
or federal courts of appeals.
2. Summary Proceedings-GeneralBusiness Law Section 133.196
This' provision, formerly New York Penal Law Section 964,197 is designed to "provide a new and summary proceeding not heretofore
available by which an aggrieved party in a proper case can obtain
speedy and drastic relief without the delays incident to a plenary
action."'19 8 It is a powerful provision which provides for criminal
prosecution and/or injunctive relief in cases where the defendant
imitated the symbol with the intention of causing deception. It has
195. Gold Master Corp. v. Miller, 380 F.2d 128, 130 n.1 (2d Cir. 1967).
196. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 133 (McKinney 1968) provides:
No person, firm or corporation shall, with intent to deceive or mislead the
public, assume, adopt or use as, or as part of, a corporate, assumed or trade
name, for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade, or for any other
purpose, any name, designation or style, or any symbol or simulation thereof,
or a part of any name, designation or style, or any symbol or simulation
thereof, which may deceive or mislead the public as to the identity of such person, firm or corporation or as to the connection of such person, firm or corporation with any other person, firm or corporation; nor shall any person, firm or
corporation, with like intent, adopt or use as, or as part of, a corporate, assumed or trade name, for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade,
or for any other purpose, any address or designation of location in the community which may deceive or mislead the public as to the true address or
location of such person, firm or corporation. A violation of this section shall be
a misdemeanor. Whenever there shall be an actual or threatened violation of
this section, an application may be made to a court or justice having jurisdiction to issue an injunction, upon notice to the defendant of not less than five
days, to enjoin and restrain such actual or threatened violation; and if it shall
appear to the satisfaction of the court or justice that the defendant is in fact
assuming, adopting or using such name, and that the assumption, adoption or
use of such name may deceive or mislead the public, an injunction may be
issued by said court or justice, enjoining and restraining such actual or threatened violation without requiring proof that any person has in fact been deceived
or mislead thereby.
.See generally Alexander, A Summary Civil Remedy for Trade-Name Infringement: The
New York Experience, 14 SYrAcus. L. REv. 1 (1962).

197. Laws of N.Y. [1937] ch. 638.
198. Association of Contracting Plumbers v. Contracting Plumbers Ass'n, 302 N.Y.
495, 498, 99 N.E.2d 542, 544 (1951).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 25

been held that the criminal and civil components are severable and
that a plaintiff in a civil proceeding under the statute need not prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt nor need it show that the defendant
had a criminal intent.199 Furthermore, since the gravamen of the action is the deceptive intent, the moving party need not show that the
imitated symbol had acquired secondary meaning or that any deception actually occurred as a result of the imitation.2 00 In terms of relief, an action brought under this provision differs in at least two fundamental respects from an ordinary unfair competition action: (1) the
plaintiff receives a markedly expedited hearing;201 and (2) the remedy
20 2
is limited to an absolute injunction.
In addition, this provision simplifies the procedural aspects of
bringing suit. An application for a hearing does not require the usual
complaint and summons. It is sufficient that the plaintiff file only a petition and notice of a motion.203 But while it is easy to get into court
under this statute, once there the plaintiff bears a heavy burden. The
proof must show (1) intent on the part of the defendant which is (2)
clear and convincing (3) to the extent that there is not any real issue to
be tried. 2°4 In Fainblatt v. Leo Sportswear Co.20 5 the respondent's explanation for the choice of the tradename was that the name of the
principal salesperson was "Leo" and that the name was short, readily remembered and easily pronounced. The justification was dismissed as
ludicrous and a summary injunction issued. Similarly, in Snyder v.
Kramer,20 6 relief was granted after the respondent admitted that its
199. Julius Restaurant, Inc., v. Lombardi, 282 N.Y. 126, 129, 25 N.E.2d 874, 876
(1940); Fainblatt v. Leo Sportswear Co., 178 Misc. 2d 760, 762, 36 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (semble).
200. "No material injury need be shown, the statute explicitly allowing the court
to grant an injunction 'without requiring proof that any person has in fact been deceived or mislead'." Playland Holding Corp. v. Playland Center, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 300, 303,
135 N.E.2d 202, 203, 152 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (1956). "Appellants further contend that
the name has acquired no 'secondary meaning' . . . Such proof is not essential to the
success of a motion under the section herein." Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v.
Dunkin Donuts, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 228, 231, 188 N.Y.S.2d 132, 136 (3d Dep't
1959). See generally Alexander, supra note 196, at 9-11.
201. Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardi, 282 N.Y. 126, 25 N.E.2d 874 (1940).
202. Charles F. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Lancaster Homes, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d
14, 240 N.Y.S.2d 183 (4th Dep't 1963).
203. Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardi, 282 N.Y. 126, 25 N.E.2d 874 (1940).
But service of the petition and notice of motion must, of course, conform to the procedures prescribed by the N.Y. Civ. PPAc. LAw (McKinney 1963), (Supp. 1974). International Underwear Corp. v. International Mills, Inc. 121 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct.
1953).
204. Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz Military Sales, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 807, 274
N.Y.S.2d 183 (1st Dep't 1966).
205. 178 Misc. 760, 36 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
206. 10 Misc. 2d 180, 168 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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choice of a tradename which was confusingly similar to plaintiff's was
"for the purpose of giving petitioners 'a taste of its own medicine.' "207
The court held that the respondent's motive in choosing the nameretaliation directed against petitioner's alleged unfair competition towards respondent-was irrelevant and that the doctrine of unclean
hands was inapplicable under the circumstances. But in cases where
the facts upon which relief is to be granted are controverted so that
there is a true issue of fact to be tried, 208 proper procedure requires
plenary, rather than summary, action.20 9
3. Cancellation of Registration-GeneralBusiness Law Section
367.210 Among the statutory remedies a party may pursue in the case
of trademark infringement is cancellation of the offending party's
registration pursuant to New York General Business Law Section
207. Id. at 181, 168 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
208. Playland Holding Corp. v. Playland Center, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 300, 303, 135
N.E.2d 202, 203, 152 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (1956), gives some indication of what a "true
issue" of fact requires:
That does not mean, however, that the right [to a summary injunction] may be
defeated by a bare denial of intent to deceive or mislead the public. The proceeding "will still lie where the respondent fails by affidavit to establish a true
issue of fact", and insubstantial or incredible averments will not suffice to
raise such an issue.
Id.
209. See, e.g., Association of Contracting Plumbers v. Contracting Plumbers Ass'n,
302 N.Y. 495, 498, 99 N.E.2d 542, 544 (1951) ; Ryan & Son, Inc. v. Lancaster Homes,
Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 14, 240 N.Y.S.2d 183 (4th Dep't 1963); Lundy v. Sposato, 37
Misc. 2d 399, 235 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (Sup. Ct. 1962). But see Wilma Gowns, Inc. v.
Wilma Juniors, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1948), where the court states, "A denial
of the application will only result in an action for unfair competition which, on the facts
here adduced, would result in an injunction." Id. at 121.
210. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 367 (McKinney 1968) provides:
The secretary of state shall cancel from the register:
(1) After one year from the effective date of this article, all registrations
under prior acts which are more than ten years old and not renewed in accordance with this article;
(2) Any registration concerning which the secretary of state shall receive
a voluntary request for cancellation thereof from the registrant or the assignee
of record;
(3) All registrations under this article and not renewed in accordance
with the provisions hereof;
(4) Any registration concerning which a court of competent jurisdiction
shall find
(a) that the registered mark has been abandoned,
(b) that the registrant is not the owner of the mark,
(c) that the registration was granted improperly,
(d) that the registration was obtained fraudulently,
(5) When a court of competent jurisdiction shall order cancellation of a
registration on any ground.
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367.211 Cancellation may be predicated on proof of abandonment, im212
proper registration, or other suitable grounds.
Since the impact of registration itself is limited to, at most, an
evidentiary function,2 13 the effect of cancellation should arguably be
limited to a loss of that benefit. Apparently no cases on this issue have
been litigated.
In the few cases which have dealt with cancellation, the provision
has been restrictively applied. In Gold Master Corp. v. Miller2

4

it was

held that a defendant may not raise the issue of cancellation by way of
a defense to an action for infringement and unfair competition; the
defendant must proceed against the plaintiff by way of counterclaim.
In Wolfies Restaurant v. DeSapiolt5 the petitioners instituted an article 78216 proceeding against the Secretary of State seeking cancellation
of a mark which was allegedly improperly and fraudulently obtained.
The court held that absent an adjudication resulting in a finding of
one of the prescribed grounds for cancellation the Secretary was powerless to order cancellation. The court indicated in dicta that mandamus
would be appropriate if the Secretary had refused to act after a court
made one of the required findings. Two other cases underline the
limited judicial willingness to invoke the cancellation provision. One
ground for cancellation, abandonment, because it effectuates a forfeiture of property, was strictly interpreted in Neva-Wet Corp. v. Never
Wet Processing Corp.217 where the court required proof "of definite
acts . . . which indicate an actual intention permanently to give up

use of the trade-mark." 21 And in Cornell University v. Messing
Bakeries, Inc.,2 19 where the defendant utilized plaintiff's name in con-

nection with its sale of bread, a lower court ordered an injunction and
cancellation of its registration. The appellate division modified the
injunction, making it less burdensome on the defendant, and permitted
the defendant to register (or retain registration of) the name subject
to the terms of the injunction as modified.
211. See Herbert Products, Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., I Misc. 2d 71, 145
N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
212. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 367 (McKinney 1968). For the text of this section,
see note 210 supra.
213. Dole, supra note 112.
214. 380 F.2d 128 (2d ir. 1967).
215. 2 Misc. 2d 623, 153 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
216. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW art. 78 (McKinney 1963).
217. 277 N.Y. 163, 13 N.E.2d 755 (1938).
218. Id. at 173-74, 13 N.E.2d at 760.
219. 135 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 285 App. Div. 490, 138
N.Y.S.2d 280 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 722, 128 N.E.2d 421, reargument denied,
309 N.Y. 800, 130 N.E.2d 601 (1955).
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C. Status of Selected " Unfair" Practices
1. Product Simulation. The preceeding discussion in this Comment has assumed, tacitly at least, application of misrepresentation doctrine in the context of a trade symbol or product package dress imitation. Where the product itself is copied, the misrepresentation rationale
previously developed applies by analogy, but with one important
qualification: the functional/nonfunctional distinction which will be
discussed shortly. For purposes of analysis a tripartite chronological
division is helpful: the law prior to 1964; the impact of the Supreme
220
and
Court's twin decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
221
and
progeny;
their
and
Inc.,
Lighting,
v.
Day-Brite
Compco Corp.
an assessment of the current status of product imitation.
(a). Status Prior to 1964. Two cases decided in 1917, one by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the other by a state court, firmly
established the general principles by which product simulation cases
were to be decided. In Diamond Expansion Bolt Co. v. United States
Expansion Bolt Co.,222 the defendant copied in all material respects
two different types of unpatented wall fasteners (expansion type bolts
and screws with anchors) originally produced by plaintiff. The court
held that there existed a right to copy unpatented essential features,
and defined that term broadly as any feature "necessary either for efficiency in service, or for economy in manufacture, so that it would be
less perfect, less efficient and less economical to produce if any one was
omitted."' 3 Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court in Crescent
Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 4 came to a similar conclusion. In
that case the plaintiff manufactured a wrench which was adjustable to
various nut sizes by means of a thumb wheel. This type of wrench,
which had plaintiff's name printed on the handle, had become commonly known as a "Crescent" wrench. Defendant subsequently began
manufacture and sale of a wrench identical to plaintiff's in all respects
except that the defendant's name was placed on the handle. The
opinion clarified the principles of law involved. If the non-functional
features had acquired a secondary meaning and if the plaintiff's imitation of them would be deceptive, then an action would lie. Unpatented
functional features, on the other hand, could not be monopolized by
the application of unfair competition principles.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

376 U.S. 225 (1964).
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
177 App. Div. 554, 164 N.Y.S. 433 (1st Dep't 1917).
Id. at 563, 164 N.Y.S. at 439.
247 F. 299 (2d Cir.- 1917).
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Thus the plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through
false representations that those are his wares which in fact are not,
but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling.
The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiff's goods
slavishly down to the minutest225
detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.

Moreover, the court held that the remedy in a case of non-functional
copying must reflect these competing interests--no absolute injunction would issue. On remand the lower court was limited to ordering
such differentiation of the goods as would effectively distinguish them,
subject to minimizing the expense required of the defendant. To this
standard Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co.,228 a Supreme Court case decided in 1938, added one further qualification, resolving an issue which
was left open in the Crescent ToolJ2 decision: if the feature copied
were functional and if confusion as to source was likely as a result of
the imitation, the defendant might be required to identify its product
so as to reasonably distinguish it from plaintiff's product. 228 Subsequent
cases decided under New York law have tended to adhere to these criteria,229 although some decisions, predicated on the Santa's Workshop
225. Id. at 301.
226. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).

227.
The proper meaning of the phrase "nonfunctional," is only this: That in such
cases the injunction is usually confined to nonessential elements, since these
are usually enough to distinguish the goods, and are the least burdensome for
the defendant to change. Whether changes in them are in all conceivable cases
the limit of plaintiff's right is a matter not before us. If a case should arise
in which no effective distinction was possible without change in functional
elements, it would demand consideration ....
247 F. at 301.
228. 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938).
229. E.g., Mavco, Inc. v. Hampden Sales Ass'n, 273 App. Div. 297, 77 N.Y.S.2d
510 (1st Dep't 1948) (must show secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion);
Ventura Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 322 N.Y.S.2d 93
(Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (lst Dep't 1972) (design
imitation held permissible where there were distinguishing characteristics); American
Merri-Lei Corp. v. Jet Party Favors, Inc., 123 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (secondary
meaning must be shown before non-functional copying will be enjoined); Walco Bead
Co. v. Union Novelty Co., 106 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (no action in the absence
of confusion and secondary meaning); Raenore Novelties, Inc., v. Superb Stitching Co.,
47 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (refusal to create a common law patent or copyright,
refusal to apply the misappropriation doctrine to product simulation); United States
Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. Bright Star Battery Co., 6 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (functional copying in absence of patent permissible).
An interesting variant occurred in one case, Oleg Cassini, Inc., v. Dorene Fashions
Corp. 155 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1956), reeid, 3 App. Div. 2d 706, 159 N.Y.S.2d 664
(1st Dep't 1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 826, 149 N.E.2d 899, 173 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1958). In
this case the trial court's injunction of defendant's imitation of plaintiff's dresses was
based on an agreement between the parties which had been executed as part of a previ-
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authority in dispensing with secondary meaning, have apparently en28 0
joined copying on less rigorous grounds.
The plaintiff's burden of proof in the case of product imitation
may be heavier than in a case of trademark infringement or misrepresentation. For the plaintiff to be entitled to an action granting anything beyond very limited injunctive relief plaintiff must demonstrate
not only that secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion are
present, but also that the deceptive portion of the copy involved nonfunctional features. 231 Where functional features are involved the
plaintiff's action is generally limited to an injunction requiring the defendant to distinguish its product from plaintiff's.3 2
The line separating functional from nonfunctional attributes is
not always easy to ascertain. For example, in Murray v. Merians23 the
plaintiff manufactured and retailed contour shoes made from plaster
molds of the purchaser's feet. The bulk of plaintiff's shoes were designed
with several sets of lines or cords on the shoe surface. The defendant
sold shoes similarly styled. The court concluded that some of the lines
or cords were purely decorative and therefore nonfunctional, while
others strengthened the shoe construction and were therefore functional. On that basis, plus the requisite showing of source association
and confusion, the court enjoined the defendant from copying the
decorative lines and cords but allowed copying of the functional lines
and cords.
A careful survey of a number of cases which turned on "func2
tionality" was undertaken in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc. 4
ous design patent infringement settlement. The terms of the agreement required the
defendant to refrain from product imitation. The appellate division reversed, stating that
the agreement was overbroad and therefore unenforceable.
230. E.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1959) (injunction against imitation if the defendant engaged in a predatory practice);
Flint Co. v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dicta indicating copying may be enjoined without secondary meaning); Catalina, Inc., v. Ganis,
207 Misc. 1068, 142 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (holding that in the absence of
secondary meaning product imitation will be enjoined if there is palming off).
231. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 679, 691 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Murray v. Merians, 149 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
232. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp, v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Corp.,
305 U.S. 111 (1938). But see Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 345 (9th
Cir. 1952).
If defendant simulates plaintiff's product (even if only its functional features) with
the intention of passing off, additional remedies may be available. See Ronson Art
Metal Works, Inc. v. Gibson Lighter Mfg., 205 Misc. 155, 127 N.Y.S. 786 (Sup. Ct.
1953), modified, 283 App. Div. 937, 130 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d
955, 166 N.E.2d 189, 198 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1960).
233. 149 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
234. 216 F. Supp. 670, 691-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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The cases divide approximately into two broad categories: those holding narrowly that functionality is only present if the feature is absolutely necessary to the article's use (the utilitarian perspective) and
those cases which adopt a broader approach, holding that any feature
which helps stimulate consumer demand is functional to the item.
Without attempting here to canvass the opinions, it is sufficient to
note that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and other courts have
gone both ways.3 5 The carefully reasoned opinion in Zippo considered
the competing policies served by narrow and broad interpretationsthe familiar themes of consumer deception, misappropriation of plaintiff's labor, and stimulation of competition-and adopted the following
test, which straddles the two broad classes: "[A] feature of goods is
functional at least if it affects their purpose, action, or performance,
or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using them, and
possibly also if it affects the buyer's choice because of its pleasing
appearance. "236 The opinion gave additional content to this standard
by referring to the position adopted by the Restatement of Torts:
When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional because they definitely contribute to that
value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods
are intended ....The determination of whether or not such features

are functional depends upon the question of fact whether prohibition
of imitation by others will deprive the others
of something which will
2
substantially hinder them in competition. 37
This approach seems to adequately reconcile the competing interests
involved in product simulation cases.
(b). The Impact of Sears and Compco. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co. 2 88 the defendant, Sears, sold a pole lamp which was sub-

stantially identical to Stiffel's original in both functional and nonfunctional aspects. Stiffel's design and utility patents on the lamp were held
invalid. Thus the question which the Court purported to answer was
"whether a State's unfair competition law can, consistently with federal patent laws, impose liability or prohibit the copying of an article
which is protected by neither a federal patent nor a copyright." 28 9 The
235. Id. at 691-95.
236. Id. at 695.
237. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, comment a at 629-30 (1938). The standard
developed by the Restatement and Zippo was applied in Ventura Travelware, Inc. v.
Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 650, 322 N.Y.S.2d 93, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1971),
aff'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (lst Dep't 1972).
238. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
239. Id.
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Court answered in the negative. Its decision rested on a theory of federal preemption: state law may not do indirectly that which it could
not do directly (e.g., extend the life of a patent or grant monopoly
rights to an article falling below the minimum patentability standards).
240
The companion decision in Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,

was based on a similar factual situation. Day-Brite had developed a
fluorescent lighting fixture incorporating a lattice reflector which added
both strength and attractiveness. The lattice was covered by a design
patent which was held invalid. The court noted that the ribbing structure served both functional and nonfunctional purposes, that the defendant utilized Day-Brite's lattice structure despite the fact that other
configurations would serve equally well, that Day-Brite's lattice structure possessed secondary meaning, and that there was a likelihood
of confusion. Nevertheless, on the preemption doctrine announced in
Sears, the Court held that state law could not be used to impose liability for, or to enjoin the copying of, the product.
Read broadly these cases would sharply restrict the operation of
unfair competition law, The decisions did, however, leave the door
slightly ajar. The opinions indicated that while state law could not
sustain an absolute injunction or an award for damages, more limited
equitable relief, in the form of requiring labelling sufficient to dissipate possible confusion, would be permissible.
Subsequent cases have seemingly withdrawn from any language
which suggested an absolute preemption of state unfair competition
law. Lear v. Adkins, 241 for example, involved, among other things, complicated questions of pre-patent protection during invention development in an employee/employer setting. The Court indicated that the
employer's liability to the employee for benefits obtained by prepatent disclosure would be determined by state law. In Goldstein v.
California24 the Court held that federal copyright law did not preempt state law from imposing criminal sanctions on musical recording
piracy. Most recently, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,243 the Court
held that state trade secret laws were not preempted by federal patent
law.
Thus even if Sears and Compco originally threatened federal preemption in the area of product simulation, that momentum has been
curtailed by the more recent cases. At most Sears and Compco currently
240. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
241. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
242. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
243.

416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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stand for the proposition that under state law courts may not issue
absolute injunctions against product simulation.
(c). Current Status of Product Simulation. There appears to be
little New York case law directly on the topic of product simulation
in the aftermath of Sears and Compco. Those cases, given the narrow
reading required by subsequent developments, allow for only qualified
product imitation in a manner entirely consistent with the case law
developed prior to 1964. It appears that a plaintiff has a cause of action
if the copied feature has acquired secondary meaning and if the imitation is likely to confuse consumers as to source. In the case of nonfunctional features the remedy will generally require that the defendant
distinguish its product, but there is the possibility of additional relief.
In the case of functional attributes, courts are reluctant in the first
instance to grant a cause of action, 244 and if an action will lie the
remedy is generally confined to requiring the defendant to identify its
product in a fashion which will render confusion improbable.
2. Truthful Use of a Mark by Another.245 Trademark and unfair
competition principles grant the plaintiff an exclusive right to use the
mark as against others whose use would be deceptive. The anti-dilution
provision, discussed in a preceding section, expands this protection
under limited circumstances. What if the defendant uses plaintiff's
name truthfully? Such use is typically non-deceptive, although a special
case of truthful but deceptive use will be considered. Assuming that
the plaintiff fails to establish dilution, the Supreme Court has held
that such a practice is not proscribed by general trademark and unfair
competition principles. New York courts have assumed a markedly
different posture. Relying on a criminal provision, 246 they have framed
a civil cause of action and have, on occasion and under specified circumstances, enjoined such practices. Some examples should serve to
illustrate the issues and the conflicting resolutions.
Prestonettes v. Coty 247 involved a situation in which the labelling
to be utilized under a district court decree rendered confusion virtually
impossible. Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed and absolutely
enjoined defendant from continuing its practice of purchasing and re244. Where a feature is functional a very strong policy (the encouragement of
unfettered competition) favors the denial of exclusive appropriation of the feature under
trademark and unfair competition principles. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray
Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971). See also Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Corp., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
245. See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 760 (1965).
246. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 279-n(6) (McKinney 1968) (text of statute appears
at note 254 infra).
247. 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
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packaging plaintiff's toilet powder and perfume and then selling the
products with a label incorporating plaintiff's registered trademarks.
The Supreme Court, reinstating the district court's decree, permitted
the defendant to continue this practice with the following labelling:
Prestonettes, Inc., not connected with Coty, states that the contents
the name of the article) independently rebottled
are Coty's-(giving
in New York.2 48
Prestonettes, Inc., not connected with Coty, states that the contents
are Coty's-(giving the name) loose powder and its own binder.
per cent.2 9
per cent, Binder Loose powder While the Court held this practice permissible because of the absence
of deception, the decision rested wholly on trademark law. The opinion
did not specify how, if at all, unfair competition doctrine might change
the result, although the Court took pains to indicate that unfair competition was not involved. The Coty holding was broadened in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders250 which alleged unfair competition as
well as trademark infringement. In that case the defendant sold
second-hand "Champion" spark plugs which it had "re-newed" in
packages which clearly indicated that the goods were orginally manufactured by Champion and had been reconditioned. The Court, relying
on Coty, held that no deception was involved, therefore no action
would lie. The opinion suggested that if reconditioning had basically
transformed the article, then a case of unfair competition might be
made out, but such was not the case.
The New York case of Lanvin Parfums v. Le Dans, Ltd.,251 involved a situation factually indistinguishable from Coty and Champion.
Here the defendants rebottled plaintiff's perfume and toilet water,
labelling the articles, typically, as:
LANVIN'S
ARPEGE
Eau de Lanvin
REBOTTLED
FROM THE
GENUINE PRODUCT
By
Le Dans, Ltd.
WHOLLY INDEPENDENT
OF LANVIN
New York, N. Y. 1 Dram
248. This label was to be used on the rebottled perfume.
249. This label was to be applied to the repackaged powder.
250. 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
251. 9 N.Y.2d 516, 174 N.E.2d 920, 215 N.Y.S.2d 257, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
834 (1961).
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Lanvin brought an action' for injunctive relief based on a New York
statute which provides that a person who "[k]nowingly sells, offers or
exposes for sale any goods which are represented in any manner by
word or deed, to be the manufacture, packing, bottling, boxing or
product of any person, firm or corporation, other than himself, unless
such goods are contained in the original package, box or bottle and
under the labels, marks or names placed thereon by the manufacturer
who is entitled to use such marks, names, brands or trade-marks is
guilty of a misdemeanor.

25 2

The court of appeals ruled that the statute

was a constitutional exercise of the state's police power, that the provision must be interpreted literally, that Coty and Champion were inapplicable because they were not decided under the New York statute,
and that a civil injunction will lie to prevent a crime where the act
also "threaten[s] plaintiff's property rights, trademark, and goodwill.

25

3

The plaintiff's petition for certiorari was denied, and the case

has stood authoritatively since 1961.
Therefore, current New York law offers trademark holders a form
of protection against unauthorized use of their mark unavailable un2 4
der federal law. Moreover, the provision defines trademark broadly
and does not require that the mark be registered in New York (or, for
that matter, that it be registered at all).
The use of one's own name in connection with business presents a
variation of the situation just considered. 25 5r Here the use of the mark

is truthful but deceptive; in the above examples the use was truthful
and non-deceptive. Ordinarily, when deception is present the plaintiff
has no problem in obtaining relief. Traditionally, however, there has
been assumed to be some special right to use one's own name. An
252. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 279-n(6) (McKinney 1968). The case was decided
under the N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2354(6) (McKinney 1909), which was repealed, transferred and renumbered in 1965.
253. 9 N.Y.2d 516, 523, 174 N.E.2d 920, 922, 215 N.Y.S.2d 257, 261, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 834 (1961).
254. For purposes of N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 279-n(6) (McKinney 1968), N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw § 279-j (McKinney 1968) defines "trade-mark" in broad terms:
A "trade-mark" is a mark used to indicate the maker, owner or seller of an
article of merchandise, and includes, among other things, any name of a person,
or corporation, or any letter, word, device, emblem, figure, seal, stamp, diagram,
brand, wrapper, ticket, stopper, label, or other mark, law, fully adopted by
him, and usually affixed to an article of merchandise to denote that the same
was imported, manufactured, produced, sold, compounded, bottled, packed
or otherwise prepared by him; and also a signature or mark, used or commonly
placed by a painter, sculptor or other artist, upon a painting, drawing, engraving, statue or other work of art, to indicate that the same was designed
or executed by him.
255. See generally 16 BUFFALO L. Rrv. 508 (1967).
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early pronouncement by the court of appeals formulated this proposition in sweeping terms: "[E]very man has the absolute right to use
his own name in his own business, even though he may thereby interfere with or injure the business of another person bearing the same
name, provided he does not resort to any artifice or contrivance for the
purpose of producing the impression that the establishments are identical or do anything calculated to deceive. ' 256 Subsequent cases have
undercut much of the vitality of this holding and have brought the
resolution of "own name" conflicts into substantial conformity with
the general principles of unfair competition law. Thus in Sullivan v.
Ed Sullivan Radio & T.V., Inc.,2 57 where the president and principal
stockholder of the defendant corporation was named "Ed Sullivan,"
and where the plaintiff was a well known television entertainer who
had previously used his name in endorsing certain brands of television
sets, the court found a possibility of confusion present and ordered
injunctive relief. In Charles F. Ryan & Son, Inc. v. Lancaster Homes,
Inc., 258 the defendant advertised as "Ryan Homes" while the plaintiff

used the name "Homes by Ryan," both firms having derived the name
from family surnames. Largely on the basis of absence of likelihood
of confusion-the opinion noted that the homes were in different price
ranges and that as a general proposition purchasers of homes tend to
inquire as to the contractor-the court denied relief. The decision underscored the special significance of names by emphasizing in its opinion
that where a family name was involved there should be judicial reluctance to enjoin its use.2 59 A more recent case which distinguished Ryan
& Son by reading its holding as turning on the finding of absence of
confusion is David L. Findlay, Inc. v. Findlay.2 60 In this case the parties were brothers, both in the business of operating art galleries, but
in different geographic areas. One brother subsequently opened a
branch, utilizing the surname, right next door to his brother's gallery,
a business which had been well established under the surname. The
evidence adduced at trial indicated a likelihood of confusion and the
court of appeals affirmed a limited injunction 261 under the principle
that
256. Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, 431-32, 20 Am. Rep. 489, 492 (1875).
257. 1 App. Div. 2d 609, 152 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1st Dep't 1956).
258. 22 App. Div. 2d 186, 254 N.Y.S.2d 473 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d
812, 205 N.E.2d 859, 257 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1965).
259. Id. at 189-90, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
260. 18 N.Y.2d 12, 218 N.E.2d 531, 271 N.Y.S.2d 652, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
930 (1966).
261. "The trial court . . . enjoined the defendant from using the names 'Wally
Findlay Galleries,' TFindlay Galleries' and any other designation including the name
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[Tihe defendant has the right to use his name. The plaintiff has the
right to have the defendant use it in such a way as will not injure
his business or mislead the public. Where there is a conflict of such
rights, it is the duty of the court so to regulate the use of his name
being afforded,
by the defendant that, due protection to the20plaintiff
2
there will be as little injury to him as possible.
A final case to be considered, and one which illustrates the delicateness of the balancing required in unfair competition cases, is Berlitz
Publications, Inc. v Berlitz.2 6 The defendant in this case was an
author of foreign language textbooks while the plaintiff corporation
published materials and operated schools for the teaching of foreign
languages. The trial court held that, regarding the defendant's language books, there was the possibility of confusion and decreed that
the defendant could indicate his authorship only if the work contained a clear disclaimer of any association with the plaintiff. On appeal
a majority of the appellate division held that the placement of the
following disclaimer on the cover of the books complied with the letter
and spirit of the decree:
Charles Berlitz, world-famous linguist and author of more than 100
language teaching books, is the grandson of the founder of the Berlitz
Schools. Since 1967, Mr. Berlitz has not been connected with the
Berlitz Schools in any way.26

One judge, dissenting in part, would have ordered modification of the
disclaimer by deletion of "the reference to his [the defendant's] obvious competition, which reference implies more than it disclaims,"12 0
while another judge, dissenting, would have required some further
differentiation, possibly by placing a disclaimer or enjoining the defendant from use of his name on the book's spine. 260
III. MISAPPROPRIATION IN NEW YORK

A. Origins
Misappropriation2 67 denotes the theory of recovery in those cases
which have followed International News Service v. The Associated
TFindlay' in the conduct of an art gallery on East 57th Street." Id. at 17, 218 N.E.2d
at 533, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
262. Id. at 21, 218 N.E.2d at 533, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
263. 45 App. Div. 2d 825, 357 N.Y.S.2d 98 (lst Dep't 1974).
264. Id. at 827, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
265. Id. (Kupferman, J., dissenting in part).
266. Id., 357 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (Steuer, J., dissenting).
267. Misappropriation is treated in some detail in R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COPETrrMON, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 60-62 (3d ed. 1967); J. McCARTHY, TRADE-

1975]

UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

26 8 in awarding relief for a wrongful taking of an intangible trade
PresS
value. In that 1918 case the defendant International News Service
(INS), excluded by the Allies from directly reporting war news as a
result of alleged pro-German sympathies, sought to use news gathered
by Associated Press (AP). INS engaged in a variety of practices to secure
news orginally developed by AP. Employees of AP members were
bribed, and AP members were induced to breach agreements by allowing INS to obtain news before publication. Also, uncopyrighted news
was taken from public bulletin boards and early editions of AP newspapers and published in either copied or rewritten form. The Supreme
Court, sitting in equity under the now defunct rule of Swift v. Tyson, 69 affirmed an injunction against all of these practices. By enjoining INS from rewriting uncopyrighted material gathered by plaintiff
for as long as the underlying information retained its news value, the
Court created a property right in news as between the parties. Although
such innovation is now understood to have important implications
both for federal system issues and for the regulation of a competitive
market, Chief Justice Pitney's majority opinion (as well as the partial
concurrence of Justice Holmes and the dissent of Justice Brandeis)
concerned itself solely with the latter inquiry. The majority's implication of a property right in gathered news was placed on moral and
economic grounds. The moral basis is found in the Court's statement
that defendant "is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and...
is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown. ' 270 The
Court stated that the underlying equitable principle relied upon was
"that he who has fairly paid the price should have the beneficial use
of the property." 271 The explicitly economic ground of the Court's opinion was that a rule implying abandonment of property rights upon
publication "would render publication profitless, or so little profitable
as in effect to cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in
comparison with the return." 272
Justice Holmes' partial concurrence took the position that gathered
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 10.23-10.35 (1973); Callman, He Who Reaps
Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55
Hi v. L. REv. 595 (1942); RahI, The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHIO
ST. L.J. 56 (1962); Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriationin Unfair Competition, 11
VAND. L. Rv.483 (1958); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HAIv.
MARKS

L. Rnv. 888, 932 (1964).
268. 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter referred to as INS].
269. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
270. 248 U.S. at 239-40.
271. Id. at 240.
272. Id. at 241.
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news was not among the values protected by the law. He saw defendant's
wrong as a species of false advertising or inverse passing off (i.e., selling another's goods as one's own).2 73 He would have required INS to
disclose the source of its information. Justice Brandeis' dissent argued
that, although plaintiff should have some remedy, the complexity of
the issue and the public interests at stake required a legislative rather
27 4
than a judicial solution.
Since 1918, New York courts have invoked misappropriation to
protect news,2 75 artistic2 70 and athletic277 performances, movies,278 dress

designs,2 79 commercial goodwill 280 and other miscellaneous intangibles, 281 frequently in conjunction with defendant's interference with
exclusive contractual rights or breach of confidence. 28 2 The doctrine has
become to New York's law of intangible trade values what the prima
facie tort is to the law of intentional injuries. Just as the prima facie
tort provides relief against intentional, unjustified harms not cognizable
273. Id. at 247.
274. Id. at 248.
275. Bond Buyer v. Dealer's Digest Publishing Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 158, 267
N.Y.S.2d 944 (1st Dep't 1966). See also Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Telegraph Co.,
50 How. Pr. 194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876).
276. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795
(1st Dep't 1951).
277. National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 133 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (granting temporary injunction); National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct.
1955) (granting permanent injunction and damages).
278. Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q. 461
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Ist
Dep't 1964).
279. Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd,
2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1st Dep't 1956). But see Societe Comptoir v.
Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962) (absent breach of a confidential relationship, uncopyrighted dress design cannot be protected by unfair competition).
280. Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 913 (1965).
281. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.N.Y.)
(granting a temporary injunction) aff'd on other grounds, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y.
1963) (granting a permanent injunction) (answers to physics textbook); New York
World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 896,
251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1964) (exclusive license to market postcards of exhibition);
W. Walley, Inc. v. Saks & Co., 266 App. Div. 193, 41 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1943)
(customer lists).
282. Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aJJ'd, 2
App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1st Dep't 1956); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941). One court has gone
so far as to suggest that misappropriation in New York is limited to breach of confidence
or interference with contractual relations. Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp.
28, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Only the broadest construction of "interference with contractual relations" can sustain this interpretation. See Bond Buyer v. Dealer's Digest Publishing Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 158, 267 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1st Dep't 1966).
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within traditional "nominate" tort categories,2 8 3 misappropriation confers a property right in an intangible which fails to merit protection
through explicit statutory or decisional schemes, such as copyright or
idea submission law, when such an award will enhance the competitive system in a manner consistent with state and federal constitutional
competence. The impact of the award of a property right is dual: the
limited monopoly thus effected offers an incentive to the creation and
marketing of the intangible, and certain business practices have been
deemed improper, thus fostering standards of commercial morality and
preventing unjust enrichment.
28 4
Given the rejection of misappropriation by other jurisdictions,
and the attempts to confine its scope by jurists as eminent as Justice
Brandeis 2 5 and Judge Learned Hand,2 6 its hospitable reception in the
courts of this state suggests that the values of flexibility and particularism in judicial method are accorded greater weight in New York jurisprudence than elsewhere. Correspondingly, the detriments relating
to indeterminate rights and duties are given relatively short shrift.
Seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that the subject matter
protected by misappropriation and the scope of protection afforded
elude definitive articulation. Such imprecision is a consequence of its
28 7
the
equitable, interstitial role within the law of unfair competition,
28 8
diversity of the values which that branch of law seeks to implement,
and the uncertain validity of state prohibitions of imitative conduct
in the aftermath of the broad dicta in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel

Co.

28 9

It has been suggested that misappropriation functions within the
283. See Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d
401 (1946). See also Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort
Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 563 (1959); Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 BuFFALo L. REv. 7 (1957); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New
York-Another Writ?, 42 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 530 (1968).
The ambivalence of New York courts as to requisites of pleading and proof in prima
facie tort cases is noted in S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, supra note 100, at 17 n.5.
284. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46
F. Supp. 198, 203-04 (D. Mass. 1942).
285. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248 (1918) (dissenting opinion).
286. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
287. The acceptance of the prima facie tort principle in New York also supports
this proposition. See note 283 supra.
288. It has been suggested that the equitable, case by case adjudicative method
of unfair competition operates in a fortuitous and unsystematic manner. Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 259 (1935).
o
289. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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law of intangible trade values as a tort of last resort. Inasmuch as all
protection of intangibles is against an appropriation, the application of
misappropriation can only make sense when a plaintiff has failed to
meet the prerequisites of the other legal theories which protect intangibles. Otherwise, the entire law of commercial intangibles would
290
collapse into the single category of misappropriation.
B. LeadingNew York Cases
The New York Court of Appeals first endorsed misappropriation in
1921, three years after INS, in Fisher v. Star Co. 291 Defendant in that
case was enjoined from imitating plaintiff's uncopyrighted comic strip,
and from using the words "Mutt and Jeff" in connection therewith.
The court found a property right in plaintiff's cartoon figures and
characters but emphasized the additional wrong of deception upon
the public. Some reliance was placed upon Justice Holmes' concurring
opinion in INS in the court's finding of inverse passing off: the sale
of another's goods as one's own. This reliance left ambiguous the version of INS New York had accepted, i.e., Pitney's property rights approach or the Holmes false advertising theory.
It was not until 1932, in Rudolph Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Pathe
News, Inc.,2 92 that a New York court awarded a property right in an
intangible in the absence of a likelihood of consumer confusion. In a
memorandum opinion, the appellate division sustained the grant of an
injunction to plaintiff, an exclusive licensee for film rights to a boxing
match held in Ebbets Field, against the defendant's distribution of
films taken from the roof of a building adjoining the stadium.
The first explicit discussion and acceptance of Justice Pitney's
version of misappropriation without alleged consumer confusion came
in 1950 in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp.293 Defendant in that case was marketing technically inferior
290. The close nexus between policies effectuated by misappropriation and those
implemented through trade secret law, common law copyright and passing off is illustrated by cases which, though invoking misappropriation, do so in a context to which
another theory of unfair competition seems equally applicable. Flexitized, Inc. v. National

Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964) (passing off); Nikanov v. Simon &
Schuster, 144 F. Supp. 375, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (common law copyright); W. Walley,
Inc. v. Saks & Co., 266 App. Div. 193, 41 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1943) (trade secret).
.See also P. GoLbSTEI, supra note 121, at 109.
291. 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921).
292. 235 App. Div. 774, 255 N.Y.S. 1016 (1st Dept 1932), explained in Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845
(lst Dep't 1938).
293. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), af'd, 279 App. Div. 632,
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (lst Dept 1951).
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sound recordings taken from radio broadcasts of plaintiff's opera performances and using plaintiff's name in advertising the records. Metropolitan's complaint contained no allegation of competition with defendant or deception of consumers as to source. It stated that Metropolitan derived income from live performances, from the broadcast
of such performances, and from licensing the exclusive right to make
and sell phonograph records to a recording company. It further alleged
that defendants had recorded the broadcast performances and made
and sold records of those performances. In upholding the sufficiency of
the complaint, the court said that
with the passage of those simple and halcyon days when the chief
business malpractice was "palming off" and with the development of
more complex business relationships and, unfortunately, malpractices,
many courts, including the courts of this State, extended the doctrine
of unfair competition beyond the cases of "palming off." The extension resulted in the granting of relief in cases where there was no
fraud on the public, but only a misappropriation for the commercial
advantage of one person of a benefit or "property right" belonging
to another.29 4
As to the competition requisite, the court stated that [t]he modem
view as to the law of unfair competition does not rest solely on the
ground of direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that
property rights of commercial value are to be and will be protected from
any form of . .. commercial immorality, and a court of equity will
penetrate and restrain every guise resorted to by the wrong-doer.29 5
Property rights, recognized by the court as "any civil right of a
pecuniary nature," were seen as "more in the nature of a legal conclusion than a description." In reaching the conclusion that Metropolitan had a property right in its name, reputation, performances and
licenses, the court relied on two aspects of the parties' relationship:
Metropolitan's need for an incentive to the production of its performances and Wagner-Nichols' unworthiness to "gather in the harvest the
seeds of which were planted and nurtured by others at great expense
and with consummate skill." The liberalized misappropriation of
Metropolitan Opera was subsequently approved by the court of appeals in Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc.2 96 Judge Greenberg's
294. 199 Misc. at 793, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
295. Id. at 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
296. 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959).
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opinion in Metropolitan Opera remains after twenty-five years the
most thorough judicial assessment of the misappropriation doctrine.
C. Statement of a Claim for Misappropriation
There is no definitive list of the activities which constitute unfair
competition. 297 The limitless imagination of competitors and constant
flux in cultural values and technology can be expected to generate new
practices which courts will feel compelled to control. Consequently,
determination of the sufficiency of allegations of misappropriation has
been said to depend "more upon the facts set forth, and less upon
technical requirements than in most causes of action."29 8 Judicial evaluation of allegations of misappropriation is, then, a complex process.
Consideration extends to: (1) the nature of the intangible, its quality
and uniqueness; (2) the extent of the harm to plaintiff's revenue base
and resultant loss of incentive to creation and marketing; (3) the ethical
appropriateness of defendant's conduct (i.e., did it breach a confidential
relationship, or is the defendant getting for free something for which
others have paid in order to obtain an exclusive license?), and (4)
whether the award of a property right will conflict with the operation
of the patent and copyright statutes, antitrust principles or the first
amendment. Put briefly, a sufficient statement of a cause of action must
plead and offer to prove facts showing a "wrongful" taking of an intangible trade value, and that the monopoly thus created will not
conflict with federal patent or copyright law, antitrust principles, or the
first amendment.
D. Subject MatterProtected by Misappropriation
1. News. Since INS2 99 the property right of the newsgatherer in
its product has been the paradigm of misappropriation. To the extent
that consumers purchase news to ascertain facts rather than to experience them in a particular form of expression, the copyright monopoly
available to newspaper publishers is inadequate because it protects
only the form of expression rather than its factual content. Where the
"lead time" between plaintiff's first publication and the appropriator's
publication is insufficient to allow plaintiff a reasonable return on his
investment, an equitable property right in news functions as an incentive to continued investment in its collection and dissemination. This
297. Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 431, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 451 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
298. Id. at 431, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 451-52.
299. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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prevents the appropriator who has not invested in the apparatus of
news gathering from enrichment at the plaintiff's expense.
Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co. 3 0 0 typifies New

York's protection of news through the doctrine of misappropriation.
Plaintiff published a newsletter and operated a wire service which
disseminated information relevant to securities markets. Defendant,
although not a subscriber, was using information taken from the teletype service to publish identical news items simultaneously with plaintiff. Plaintiff met its burden of proof in showing a taking by planting
on its wire information of a purported bond issue by a non-existent
government agency. Defendant's subsequent publication of that news
item convinced the court that a misappropriation action should lie.
Although, as the Bond Buyer court pointed out, it is "no longer
subject to question that there is a property in the gathering of
news ... "01 the extent of that property is problematic. If, for instance,
the defendant in Bond Buyer had chosen to preface its reports with
a statement to the effect that Bond Buyer Wire Service had reported
this information today, it is not at all certain that the court would have
objected. Literally, defendants would have been reporting facts different from those published by plaintiff, namely, the facts of publication. If the statement "X published fact Z today" is deemed sufficiently different from the mere appropriation and reportage of fact
Z to evade misappropriation's protection, future X's will have less
incentive to invest in the apparatus of newsgathering. On the other
hand, such a result would provide X with a measure of reward in the
form of atribution of source and would be consistent with first amendment and antitrust principles.
2. Athletic and Artistic Performances. When an event is produced without intent to abandon rights of reproduction or broadcast,
New York has prohibited unauthorized uses on a misappropriation
theory. In general, intent to retain rights has been inferred from
plaintiff's licensing practices. Notices printed on tickets30 2 and sale
of exclusive broadcast licenses303 have been used for this purpose.
The requirement of explicit indications of intent to retain rights
has not been uniform. In Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. Docu300. 25 App. Div. 2d 158, 267 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1st Dep't 1966).

301. Id. at 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
302. National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 133 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1954), 143
N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
303. Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d
419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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mentaries Unlimited, Inc. 0 4 the trial court found that a news broadcaster's voice and style in announcing the death of President Kennedy
was "a form of art expression, and his distinctive and valuable property." The court concluded that no specific intent to retain rights need
be shown because "[t]he rendering of a performance before the microphone does not constitute an abandonment of ownership or a dedication of it to the public at large."' 0 5
3. Goodwill and Publicity Values. The conventional vehicle for
regulating the appropriation of values embodied in the corporate and
individual personality are trade-symbol protection against passing off
and dilution, and privacy statutes and "rights of publicity" which regulate commercial use of individual names and likenesses. Here, as elsewhere, misappropriation performs an equitable role within the lacunae
left by these laws.
In Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co.,80 (
defendant movie producer had negotiated a license to film plaintiff's
hockey team, ostensibly for use in newsreels. The film clips were subsequently used by defendant in a feature length movie, creating the
misleading impression that the film contained genuine scenes of
plaintiff's team from a Stanley Cup hockey game. In finding misappropriation by the defendant, the court relied primarily on the fact that
[p]laintiff had built up a valuable business licensing the use of genuine
photographs taken in the Garden in feature moving pictures, and
from that business had derived substantial revenue. That business had
been created by the expenditures on plaintiff's part of large sums of
money and of effort and skill in management of its enterprise.80 7
The same considerations enabled plaintiff in New York World's
Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. ColourpicturePublishingInc.,08 to obtain an
injunction against defendant's manufacture and sale of post cards depicting scenes from the World's Fair. Much weight was given to the
fact that defendants had bid for and failed to obtain exclusive rights
to sell postcards of the World's Fair, and that a third party had paid
for such a right.
The appellate division, third department's holding in Santa's
0 9 has been
Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling3
rationalized on misappropriation
304. 42 Misc. 2d 723, 725, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (Sup. Ot. 1964).
305. Id.
306. 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (lst Dep't 1938).
307. Id. at 464, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
308. 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1964).
309. 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3d Dep't 1953). See also text at notes
127-137 supra.
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grounds. In that case, plaintiff operated a business which advertised
widely using unique designs of Santa Claus and other characters.
Defendant operated two nearby businesses which were alleged to
simulate plaintiff's business and advertising, thus tending to deceive
the public, mimic plaintiff's ideas and falsely suggest a relationship
between plaintiff and defendant. Secondary meaning had not yet attached to plaintiff's newly established business, and thus passing off, as
normally conceived, was unavailable. Citing INS, the court held that
secondary meaning was not essential to a finding of unfair competition
and that equitable principles required the conclusion that defendant's
acts were unfair. The holding can be justified as an instance of misappropriation's function as an incentive to the marketing of intangibles that are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by competitors.
Although misappropriation has been suggested as the most likely
theory by which celebrities could assert property rights in the publicity
values they embody, New York courts have been reluctant to innovate
remedies in addition to New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.
Those statutes are narrowly construed as privacy statutes, so that once
an individual waives his privacy, he is unable to claim that the use of
his name or likeness has exceeded his waiver.310 Any relief for such excessive use must be had at contract, if at all. Statutory privacy rights
are personal and therefore not assignable. 311 Moreover, enforcement of
312
privacy rights is subordinate to the mandates of the first amendment.
The denial of property rights in publicity values can be supported
both by deference to legislative intent,3 1 3 and by the observation that
people need no incentive to create publicity values because such values
amply compensate them in other ways. Moreover, it can be argued that
mass communications machinery accommodates, at any given time, a
constant quantity of media heroes and that a generally enforceable
property right in publicity would only make celebrities richer without increasing their number. Yet the denial of such rights leads to the
anomaly that, in a society where a person's name and likeness are
treated as commodities, the value placed upon such commodities by
the market has n6t eventuated in a property right. In effect, courts
310. Wrangell v. C.F. Hathaway Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 649, 253 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1st

Dep't 1964).
311. Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
312. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rand v. Hearst Corp., 31 App. Div.
2d 406, 298 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1st Dep't 1969), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 806, 257 N.E.2d 895, 309
N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970).
313. See Manger v. Kree Institute of Eleptrolysis, Inc., 233 F.2d 5, 8-9 (2d Cir.
1956).
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have balanced first amendment interests and the absence of a need for
incentive to create publicity against interests in reinforcing custom
and preventing unjust enrichment, and concluded that the former
14
should predominate.
E. Denial of MisappropriationProtection
1. General Principles. It is the general rule that intangibles are
in the public domain. To come within misappropriation's exception
to the rule, a plaintiff must show that the subject matter is sufficiently
different from matter in the public domain to justify the burden a
monopoly in it imposes on competition8 15 and that protection of it is
not preempted by Congress. Since federal and state policies both favor
free competition, it is not uncommon that a given subject matter fails
to qualify for protection under either competitive or federalist analyses.
Some examples of the operation of these principles include the
refusal of relief for the imitation of a character's voice,8 10 or of a band
leader's sound, 317 and for the copying of an uncopyrighted dress de319 business forms, 820
sign,3 1 8 recordings of singers' press conferences
systems of cataloguing merchandise,3 21 typefaces of uncopyrighted
books,322 unpatented products323 and greeting card formats. 8 24 This
list is not definitive, however. In some instances, courts have protected
314. See, e.g., Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 80 Misc. 2d 531, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276
(Sup. Ct. 1975). Plaintiff, a professional athlete who received several hundred thousand
dollars in 1972 in returns for commercial endorsements, objected to defendant magazine's use of his name in promotional material to stimulate subscriptions. The court's
denial of relief, though articulated in first amendment terms, might be ascribed as easily
to the ample revenues already accruing to plaintiff through contractual exploitation of
publicity values.
315. See Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF.
L. REv. 873, 887 (1971).
316. Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
317. Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 10 N.Y.2d 972, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662, 180
N.E.2d 248 (1961).
318. Societe Comptoir v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1962). But see Henry Glass & Co. v. Art-Mor Togs, Inc., 101 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
319. Current Audio, Inc. v. R.C.A. Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949
(Sup. Ct. 1973). But see Lennon v. Pulsebeat News, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. 309 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
320. Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
321. Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, Inc., 283 N.Y. 1, 27
N.E.2d 212 (1940).
322. Hebrew Book Co. v. Scharfstein, 288 N.Y. 374, 43 N.E.2d 449 (1942); see
G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
323. American Rolex Watch Corp. v. Ricoh Time Corp., 491 F.2d 877 (2d Cir.
1974) ; see text at notes 220-244 supra.
324. Riback Enterprises, Inc. v. Denham, 452 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1971).

1975]

UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

subject matter otherwise unprotectable on a misappropriation theory
in response to reprehensible conduct by defendant . 25 Moreover, the
relationship between a society's property rights and its cultural values
and technology indicates that continued changes in the latter will alter
the former.
2. Federal Preemption of Misappropriation.Justice Black's contention in Sears that no state could prohibit the copying of an unpatented or uncopyrighted article necessarily raised serious questions
about the continued vitality of misappropriation. The response to this
challenge came one month after Sears in ColumbiaBroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc. 26 A trial court there held that
the reproduction on record of a newscaster's announcement "was not
the copying of some article or goods made by another but rather the
appropriation of the very product itself taking in effect the original
and incorporating it in the record." 327 To similar effect is the court's
view in Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.,8 28 that
duplication of a film was an appropriation thereof. Copying of the film
would have entailed hiring actors to simulate the film's content. This
distinction between copying and appropriating was invoked recently
to deny relief in Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.8 29 Defendant there had
hired an actress to imitate the voice of plaintiff Shirley Booth. Booth
had played the part of Hazel in a television series of that name. While
imitating plaintiff's voice, the actress endorsed defendant's detergent
and referred to herself as "Hazel." In finding for defendant, the court
characterized the imitation as copying, state prohibition of which had
been precluded by Sears and Compco.
The distinction which these cases have sought to develop seems to
hinge upon the quantum of independent effort undertaken by the
imitator.83 0 Where the imitation involves a technically perfect duplication requiring no more than the use of recording machines, appropria325. New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc.,
21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1964) (interference with exclusive
contractual rights originally sought by defendant); Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling,
282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3d Dep't 1953) (intent to deceive). Compare,
e.g., Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem.,
2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1st Dep't 1956) (breach of confidence) with
Societe Comptoir v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
326. 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
327. Id. at 727, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
328. 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1964).
329. 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
330. See Comment, The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in
the Development of the Sears-Compco Preemption Doctrine, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 1444,
1461-63. See also P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 121, at 236-43.
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tion has occurred. When the imitator has "created" an independent
approximation of the original, no state can prohibit such copying.
As an implement for analysis of the impact of a property right in
an intangible upon the competitive system, a distinction based upon
the imitator's degree of dependence upon the original is at least defensible. To the extent that an imitator is able to duplicate another's
product with only minimal expense, he is a "free rider," a "pirate,"
enriching himself at the expense of another. Such enrichment, if
allowed, detracts from the original producer's revenue base, diminishing
the incentive to produce. The monopoly that the distinction allows the
producer of original material is a limited one which does not interfere
with independent simulation through "copying," arguably not imposing unfair restraints on trade.
As a talisman for resolution of the problems of federalism articulated in Sears and Compco, the distinction makes little sense. When
Justice Black stated that no state could prohibit the copying of an unpatented or uncopyrighted article, his dear import was that federal
copyright and patent were the sole permissible instruments of monopoly subsidy. The Court's subsequent revisions of that dicta have
looked not to the nature of permissible duplication, i.e., copying, but
to the coordination of state activity with congressional intent. Were it
possible to glean from the copyright statute and its legislative history a
congressional intention to place certain subject matter in the public
domain unless it is duplicated exactly and with minimal expense, the
distinction would have some use. That this is not the case is illustrated
by the fact that congressional definition of rights vested in, and potentially divesting from, the copyright holder takes no account of the
ease with which the thing can be reproduced. Further evidence for the
distinction's invalidity can be adduced from its peculiar unconcern for
the interests of the creator of print and film materials and sound recordings which can only lose their value to their originator by copying,
compared with its relative solicitude for the producer of three-dimensional objects which by their nature tend to be uncopiable because of
the expense and effort of reproduction. This variant treatment has no
basis in the copyright statute.
The use of a distinction between "copying" and "appropriating"
seems, then, to have been a disingenuous attempt to evade the broad
language of Justice Black. The preemptive calculus advanced by the
Kewanee Court was meant to obviate such evasions and redirect judicial analysis qf federal preemption to its proper subject: whether
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state action will present an obstacle to the fulfillment of congressional
purpose. As earlier discussion has suggested, 331 the content, if any, of
the second federal policy articulated in the Kewanee decision, retention in the public domain of public domain materials, is crucial to the
resolution of the problems in this area. Until the Court clarifies the
content of that term, practitioners will be working with only a vague
presumption favoring state authority..
VINCENT Cox
BERT SLONIM

331. See text accompanying notes 80-90 supra.

